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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is for lawyers handling medical professional liability actions
in West Virginia. Navigating West Virginia law requires an awareness of legis-
lation passed in 1986 and 2001, along with myriad decisions from the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
On two occasions, the West Virginia Legislature passed limited civil
justice reform related to medical professional liability in response to the un-
availability of medical malpractice insurance. The legislature enacted the Medi-
cal Professional Liability Act ("MPLA") in 1986.1 In 2002, the legislature
passed House Bill 601 ("HB 601"), which amended the MPLA and established a
2state insurance program for physicians not insurable in the private markets.
Overlaying these statutes, as one would expect, are many significant
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressing the
MPLA and numerous other issues. If history is any teacher, the ultimate state of
medical professional liability law in West Virginia will probably be influenced
I W. VA. CODE §§ 55-7B- 1 to -11 (2000).
2 House Bill 601 amended several different provisions of the West Virginia Code. See W.
VA. CODE §§ 33-20F-1 to -12 (Supp. 2002) (amending insurance provisions); W. VA. CODE §§
55-7B-1, 5, 6, 6a, 6b, 6c, 6d, 10, 11 (amending MPLA). As of the time of the submission of this
article, the West Virginia Legislature was considering additional civil justice reform. See H.B.
2122, 2003 Leg., 76th Sess. (W. Va. 2003) (passed by House on January 16, 2003).
2
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more by the Supreme Court of Appeals than by the legislature.3 In any event,
the intent of this article is to help guide lawyers through nearly every aspect of
West Virginia medical professional liability law.
U. OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ACT
The legislature, in passing the MPLA in 1986, intended to afford limited
protection to health care providers and facilities - hospitals, doctors, and others
- in civil actions arising from the provision of health care services.4 The MPLA
was passed in the face of an insurance crisis in West Virginia which materially
limited the ability of hospitals and physicians to obtain coverage. 5 Generally,
the MPLA, West Virginia Code sections 55-7B-1 et seq., is designed to protect
health care providers and facilities in medical professional liability (medical
malpractice) cases. 6 The MPLA accomplished this task by defining the ele-
3 Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1992). Other tort reform measures have also been held constitutional
applying a rational basis analysis. Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, 408 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va.
1991); see Hicks v. Ghaphery, 571 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2002) (rejecting "mistake of judgment"
instruction); Osborne v. United States, 567 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2002) (interpreting MPLA to
allow non-patients to sue physician); Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 558 S.E. 681 (W. Va. 2001) (applying
"discovery rule" to wrongful death actions); Gerver v. Benavides, 530 S.E.2d 701 (W. Va. 1999)
(refusing to apply "cap" to non-economic damages award); Mayhorne v. Logan Med. Found., 454
S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994) (holding expert qualifications in W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-7 (1986) uncon-
stitutional); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Fostering Mutual Respect and Cooperation Be-
tween State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. VA.
L. REV. 1 (2000).
4 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 (2000) (noting the legislative findings and declaration of purpose).
5 This article does not attempt to wade into the dispute over tort reform, on which there are
broadly conflicting views. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING
THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY
FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM (2002), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/search/daltcp/Reports/litrefm.pdf; Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The
Changing Landscape, 4 TORT SOURCE 1 (2002) (discussing judicial nullification of tort reform
legislation); Joanne Doroshow, The Insurance Cycle [The Reform Cycle], 4 TORT SOURCE 1
(2002) (arguing liability crisis caused by mismanaged underwriting practices); Mark A. Drum-
mond, Corporate America Grades States' Tort Systems, 27 LrrnG. NEWS 4 (2002) (discussing U.S.
Chamber of Commerce study ranking West Virginia as one of five worst perceived states); Newt
Gingrich, Commentary, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 2002, at 15A (advocating tort reform, including
medical courts).
6 "Medical professional liability actions" are defined to include "any liability for damages
resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort or breach of contract based on health
care services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider or health
care facility to a patient." W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-2(d) (2000). "Health care" is "any act or treat-
ment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health
care provider for, to or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment or con-
finement." Id. § 55-7B-2(a). Health care providers and facilities are defined at W. VA. CODE
§ 55-7B-2(b) to -2(c) and include doctors, nurses and hospitals, among others, as well as any
"officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of such officer's, employee's or
agent's employment." Id. § 55-7B-2(c). Key to the definitions is the issue of licensure. Health
2003]
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ments of a medical professional liability case, limiting non-economic damages,
limiting joint and several liability, establishing minimum expert requirements,
and providing procedural safeguards, including protection for settling parties.
The first consideration in evaluating an action is to determine whether
the MPLA applies. This determination depends on the type of action filed, the
date of injury, and the date the action is filed. The type of action is important,
because the MPLA applies only to civil actions that fit within its definitions.8
The dates of injury and filing are important because they trigger different ver-
sions of the statute, either the 1986 enactment or the 2002 amendments.
9
The MPLA is a definition-based statute:
The provisions of the Medical Professional Liability Act, [West
Virginia] Code section 55-7B-1 to -11 (1986), govern actions
falling within its parameters, subject to this Court's power to
promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, including rules
of practice and procedure, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of
the West Virginia Constitution.'0
When the facts underlying a cause of action fit within the definitions, the MPLA
applies; conversely, when they do not, the MPLA does not apply.
The MPLA applies to "any liability for damages resulting from the
death or injury of a person for any tort or breach of contract based on health care
services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care pro-
vider or health care facility to a patient."'"1 Generally, the statute codifies the
traditional health care provider and patient relationship as the basis for actions
claiming professional negligence. 12 The statute defines patients, 13 health care
care providers must be "licensed by, or certified in, this state or another state, to provide health
care or professional health care services." Id. Health care facilities-hospitals, nursing homes or
extended care facilities-include those "in and licensed by the state of West Virginia and any state
operated institution or clinic providing health care." Id. § 55-7B-2(a) to -(c) (2000); see id.
§§ 16-5B-1 to -12 (2000) (licensing of hospitals); id. §§ 16-5C-1 to -18 (2000) (licensing of nurs-
ing and personal care homes); id. § 16-51-1 to -6 (2000) (licensing of hospices).
7 See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 et seq. (1986).
8 Id. § 55-7B-2.
9 Id. § 55-7B-10 (Supp. 2002).
10 State ex rel. Weirton Med. Ctr. v. Mazzone, No. 30360, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 97 (June 19,
2002).
11 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-2(d).
12 "Under the common law of this State, a physician-patient relationship was required to main-
tain a medical malpractice action." Osborne v. United States, 567 S.E.2d 677, 686 (W. Va. 2002)
(Maynard, J. dissenting) (citing Weaver v. Union Carbide Corp., 378 S.E.2d 105 (W. Va. 1989));
Sisson v. Seneca Mental Health Council, 404 S.E.2d 425 (W. Va. 1991); Gooch v. West Virginia
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providers, 4 and health care facilities.15 The definitions of health care provider
and facility depend on licensure in West Virginia or any other state.1
6
In Short v. Appalachian OH-9, 17 the court examined the statutory defini-
tion of "health care provider," and concluded that the MPLA applies to the pro-
vision of emergency medical services.18 Conversely, in Ricottilli v. Summers-
ville Memorial Hospital,'9 an action arising from the performance of an autopsy,
the court held the MPLA did not apply because a dead body was not a "patient,"
defined in West Virginia Code section 55-7B-2(e) as a "natural person. 2 °
The MPLA also applies to "third party" actions against health care
providers. 2' The Act "permits a third party to bring a cause of action against a
health care provider for foreseeable injuries that were proximately caused by the
health care provider's negligent treatment of a tortfeasor patient., 22 In Osborne
v. United States,23 the plaintiffs sought damages for the deaths and severe inju-
ries of a family whose members were either killed or fatally injured in a colli-
sion with a vehicle driven by a person intoxicated with alcohol and prescription
medications. They sued the driver and also made a claim against the driver's
family physician for negligently prescribing medications.24 In Osborne, the
13 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-2(e) (patient defined as "a natural person who receives or should
have received health care from a licensed health care provider under a contract, expressed or im-
plied").
14 Id. § 55-7B-2(c) (health care provider includes "a person, partnership, corporation, facility
or institution licensed by, or certified in, this state or another state, to provide health care or pro-
fessional health care services, including but not limited to a physician, osteopathic physician,
hospital, dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physi-
cal therapist, or psychologist, or an officer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and
scope of such officer's, employee's or agent's employment").
15 Id. § 55-7B-2(b) (health care facility "includes any clinic, hospital, nursing home, or ex-
tended care facility in and licensed by the state of West Virginia and any state operated institution
of clinic providing health care").
16 See id. § 16-5B-1 to -12 (licensing of hospitals); id. § 16-5C-1 (licensing of nursing and
personal care homes); id. § 16-51-1 (licensing of hospices).
17 507 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1998).
18 Id. at 125 Syl. Pt 2.
19 425 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1993).
20 Id. at 633.
21 Osborne v. United States, 567 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2002).
22 Id. at 685; see also Osborne v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 479 (S.D. W. Va. 2001).
23 567 S.E.2d 677 (W. Va. 2002).
24 Osborne is procedurally complex. Since the defendant physician was practicing in a feder-
ally funded clinic, the claim was covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 42 U.S.C.
§ 233 (2000). Since federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA claims, the United
States intervened as a party defendant and removed the case to federal court, where the physician
was dismissed, and the United States substituted as a party defendant. After a trial to the bench in
2003]
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conclusion that third parties can bring suit came from an examination of the
MPLA's definition of "medical professional liability, 25 which includes "any
liability for damages resulting from the death or injury of a person for any tort
or breach of contract based on health care services rendered, or which should
have been rendered, by a health care provider or health care facility to a pa-
tient."26 Both the United States District Court and the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia concluded that the use of the terms "person" and "pa-
tient" demonstrated the MPLA did not limit recovery to "patients," but rather to
,4,27persons.
The date of injury or death also determines whether the MPLA or its
2002 amendments from HB 601 apply to the action. The MPLA applies to inju-
ries and deaths which occurred after June 6, 1986.28 The provisions of HB 601
apply to injuries occurring after the effective date of the MPLA,29 and to cases
filed after March 1, 2002.30
The date of injury is important because actions for pre-1986 injuries can
conceivably be filed for minors because of the lengthy statute of limitations.
31
Moreover, since HB 601 only applies to post-1986 injuries and deaths, there
may arise medical malpractice cases to which neither the MPLA nor HB 601
apply, leaving the determination to the common law of West Virginia.
The statute of limitations for actions for adults injured before 1986 has
probably expired. In addition to the two-year statute of limitations, the MPLA
contains a general statute of repose of ten years, stating "in no event shall any
such action be commenced more than ten years after the date of injury." 32 Such
statutes of repose have been upheld as constitutional.33 As will be discussed in
more detail later in this article, the expansion of the application of tolling doc-
trines by the Supreme Court of Appeals raises many issues as to whether injury
and death actions can be brought despite the apparent expiration of the statute of
federal court resulted in a plaintiff's verdict of $4.2 million dollars, the case came back to the
West Virginia Supreme Court by way of certified question. Osborne, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 479
(certifying question to Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia).
25 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-2(d).
26 Id. (emphasis added).
27 Osborne, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97; Syl. Pt. 5, Osborne, 567 S.E.2d at 678.
28 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-10 (Supp. 2002).
29 Id. § 55-7B-10(a).
30 Id. § 55-7B-10(b).
31 Id. § 55-2-15 (2000).
32 Id. § 55-7B-4 (2000).
33 Donley v. Bracken, 452 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994); Gibson v. West Virginia Dep't of
Highways, 406 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1991).
[Vol. 105
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limitations. However, the ten-year statute of repose should eliminate pre-1986
adult claims as an outside limit on the application of any tolling doctrine.34
Actions for injuries to minors and incompetents may still exist because
of the long statute of limitations. 35  Generally, under West Virginia Code
section 55-2-15, minors have until the age of majority plus two years to file suit,
though no action may be brought more than twenty years after the injury.36 The
age of majority in West Virginia is eighteen years, so these actions potentially
exist until 2006.37 The twenty-year statute of repose in West Virginia Code
section 55-2-15 is constitutional,'. and not subject to extension via the "discov-
ery rule."
39
The MPLA shortened the statute of limitations for injuries to minors.4°
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-4(b) requires that actions for minors less than
ten years old must be brought within two years of injury or prior to the minor's
twelfth birthday, whichever is longer, subject to the ten year overall limitation
contained in section 55-7B-4(a). Actions for injuries to minors ten years and
older are subject to the MPLA's general two year statute of limitations.41 Both
provisions are subject to the MPLA's ten-year statute of repose.42
An identical provision shortening the statute of limitations for minors in
the governmental immunity statute was struck down as unconstitutional in Whit-
low v. The Board of Education of Kanawha County.43 "[West Virginia Code
section] 29-12A-6 violates the Equal Protection Clause found in Section X of
34 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
35 W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15.
36 Id.
37 1986 plus eighteen years is 2004. 2004 plus two years is 2006.
38 Albright v. White, 503 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1998).
39 Donley v. Bracken, 452 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994).
40 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4(b) (2000).
41 Id. § 55-7B-4(a).
42 Id.
43 438 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1993). In Whitlow, the supreme court considered the constitutional-
ity of W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(b) which, like the MPLA, provided
[a]n action against a political subdivision to recover damages for injury,
death, or loss to a minor, brought by or on behalf of a minor who was under
the age of ten years at the time of such injury, shall be commenced within
two years after the cause of action arose or after the injury, death or loss was
discovered or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever last oc-
curs, or prior to the minor's twelfth birthday, whichever provides the longer
period.
W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-6(b) (1986). The Whitlow court held the specific statute took precedence
over the general tolling provision for minors and incompetents set forth in W. VA. CODE § 55-2-
15. 438 S.E.2d at 15.
2003]
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Article IH of the West Virginia Constitution to the extent that it denies to minors
the benefit of the statute of limitations provided in the general tolling statute.""
Although Whitlow does not directly address whether the ten-year statute of re-
pose for MPLA claims applies to minors, it leaves open the possibility that "pre-
MPLA" actions may still exist.
Certainly, the vast majority of newly filed cases will be governed by the
MPLA and HB 601. The practitioner, therefore, must be familiar with both
statutes and the case law interpreting the MPLA. To the extent the common law
of medical malpractice applies to those rare cases which fall outside the MPLA
and HB 601, the reader is referred "to the stacks" since this article will focus
primarily on the law in West Virginia since the enactment of the MPLA in
1986.45
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The MPLA codified a two-year statute of limitations as well as two toll-
ing doctrines, the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment. 46 West Virginia
Code section 55-7B-4(a) states:
A cause of action for injury to a person alleging medical profes-
sional liability against a health care provider arises as of the
date of the injury, except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section [relating to minors], and must be commenced within
two years of the date of such injury, or within two years of the
date when such person discovers, or with the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered such injury, which-
ever last occurs: Provided, that in no event shall any such ac-
tion be commenced more than ten years after the date of in-
jury.
4 7
44 Whitlow, 438 S.E.2d at 23 (citing W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15).
45 The "pre-MPLA" law of medical malpractice was exhaustively examined in Michael J.
Farrell's article in this journal. Michael J. Farrell, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Vir-
ginia, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1979). This article will not extensively address "pre-MPLA law"
except where it still appears to apply. The alert reader should read Farrell's article, both for its
historical as well as practical perspective. This journal has regularly published other articles re-
lated to medical malpractice. See, e.g., Barbara R. Benninger, Note, Nursing Malpractice - The
Nurse's Duty to Follow Orders, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 1291 (1988); James P. McHugh, Comment,
Emergency Medical Care for Indigents: All Hospitals Must Provide Stabilizing Treatment Or Pay
the Price, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 165 (1990); David Zell Myerberg, Note, The Fourth Circuit's Baby
K Decision: "Plain Language" Does Not Make Good Law, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 397 (1995).
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Section 55-7B-4(c) also tolls the statute of limitation for fraudulent con-
cealment, stating that the "periods of limitation set forth in this section shall be
tolled for any period during which the health care provider or its representative
has committed fraud or collusion by concealing or misrepresenting material
,,48facts about the injury.
A. The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule has been the subject of a series of decisions inter-
preting both the MPLA and general civil cases.49 The supreme court adopted a
general approach to the discovery rule, applicable to all torts, in Cart v.
Marcum: 0
[W]e hold today that the "discovery rule" is generally applica-
ble to all torts, unless there is a clear statutory prohibition of its
application. However, by declaring the existence of a "discov-
ery rule" we do not eviscerate the statute of limitations: the
statute of limitations will apply unless the handicaps to discov-
ery at the time of the injury are great and are largely the product
of the defendant's conduct in concealing either the tort or the
wrongdoer's identity.
The "discovery rule," then, is to be applied with great circum-
spection on a case-by-case basis only where there is a strong
showing by the plaintiff that he was prevented from knowing of
the claim at the time of the injury. The general rule is that mere
ignorance of the existence of a cause of action or of the identity
of the wrongdoer does not prevent the running of a statute of
limitations. In order to benefit from the rule, a plaintiff must
make a strong showing of fraudulent concealment, inability to
comprehend the injury, or other extreme hardship ......
Fraudulent concealment includes "concealment of the injury itself or the identity
of the tortfeasor. '' 52 Inability to comprehend the injury includes a surgeon leav-
48 Id. § 55-7B-4(c)
49 For a good overview of tolling doctrines, see Vincent Paul Cardi, Determining the Appro-
priate Time Limitations on Attorney Malpractice Lawsuits in West Virginia: A Brief Overview, 95
W. VA. L. REV. 913 (1990).
423 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1992).
51 Id. at 648 (footnotes omitted).
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ing a piece of surgical equipment in a patient or exposure to hazardous chemi-
cals where the effects were only detectable at a later time.53
Cases involving the inability to comprehend an injury are governed by
Gaither v. City Hospital.54 Applying West Virginia Code section 55-7B-4, the
Gaither court reversed the dismissal of a civil action filed almost five years after
the negligent act.55 Discussing the facts, the court noted there were no circum-
stances giving the plaintiff any reason to investigate whether malpractice was
the cause of the loss of his leg.
56
[T]here was no affirmative duty on the part of the appellant to
have sought the hospital records earlier than he did, and no duty
on the part of the appellant's parents to have informed their
adult son of their discussions with his treating physicians. It is
therefore irrelevant whether the appellant could have requested
the records before 1993, or spoken with his parents about the
cause of the loss of his leg.57
The court indicated that whether the claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions was a question of fact for the jury and remanded the case for proceedings
consistent with the opinion.58
The Gaither court stated that the discovery rule applies "where the
plaintiff knows of the existence of an injury, but does not know the injury is the
result of any party's conduct other than his own., 59 Therefore, the court held
that in all tort actions, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations runs
only when the plaintiff knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should
know (1) he has been injured, (2) the identity of the entity who owed the plain-
tiff a duty to act with due care and who may have engaged in conduct that
breached that duty, and (3) that the conduct of that entity has a causal relation-
53 Cart, 423 S.E.2d at 648 n.14.
54 487 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1977).
55 Id. After the plaintiff injured his leg in a motorcycle accident, he was transferred from a
West Virginia hospital to a trauma center in Baltimore, Maryland. There, his parents were told
that if he had been transported earlier, the blood flow might have been restored and he would not
have lost his leg. No one, including his parents, discussed this with the plaintiff. He thought the
loss of his leg was due to the motorcycle accident until 1993, when he was told by a prosthetic
specialist that it was due to loss of circulation. Then, his parents told him for the first time of their
conversations with the physicians and he contacted an attorney, who filed suit within two years.
The circuit court's dismissal on statute of limitations grounds was appealed.
56 Id. at 910.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 909-10.
59 Id. at 908.
[Vol. 105
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ship to the injury.60 "Knowledge sufficient to trigger the limitation period re-
quires something more than a mere apprehension that something may be wrong.
.. ,,61 On the other hand, "once a patient is aware, or should reasonably have
become aware, that medical treatment by a particular party has caused a per-
sonal injury, the statute begins. 62
Gaither must be analyzed in light of its facts and the rule in Cart.6 3 The
most critical fact of Gaither is the nature of the injury to the plaintiff, who lost
his leg due to the interruption of circulation occurring after the injury he sus-
tained in the motorcycle accident. The delay in identifying and treating the vas-
cular injury, not the accident, caused (or contributed to) the need for amputa-
tion.64 The focus of Gaither, therefore, was on the reasonable knowledge of the
plaintiff as to why he lost his leg, and whether he should have known the delay
in treatment was the cause, as opposed to the original traumatic injury.65
Gaither, then, is most analogous to cases where a foreign object is left in the
patient's body during surgery, or to latent injuries not discoverable by the pa-
tient.66 In those cases, the statute begins to run upon discovery of the object or
injury.67 Similarly, Gaither emphasizes the unfairness of denying recovery to a
plaintiff who did not and could not reasonably know how he was injured.
60 Id. at 909
61 Id.; see also Chancellor v. Shannon, 488 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1997) (issue of fact whether
plaintiff's knowledge precluded dismissal on SOL grounds); compare Harrison v. Davis, 478
S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996) (mere ignorance not enough, nor are inconclusive allegations that third
parties, not named as defendants, misrepresented facts), with Cart v. Marcum, 423 S.E.2d 644
(W. Va. 1992) (mere ignorance of cause of action, or identity of wrongdoer not enough to toll
statute of limitations); Findo v. Hamilton, 428 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1993) (statute began to run
when plaintiff told of malpractice by subsequent treater); Hill v. Clark, 241 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va.
1978); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965) (the statute of limitations does not
commence until the plaintiff has reason to know he was injured due to the defendant's conduct).
62 Gaither, 487 S.E.2d at 909; cf. McCoy v. Miller, No. 30632, 2003 W. Va. LEXIS 2, *11-
*12 (W. Va. Feb. 27, 2003) ("The crux of the 'discovery rule' has always been to benefit those
individuals who were either unaware of their injuries or prevented from discovering them. When
this Court augmented the application of the 'discovery rule' to cases beyond those where the
defendant actively sought to prevent the discovery of the malfeasance, we did not eradicate the
rule's additional objective of benefitting those individuals who were unaware of their injuries due
to no fault of their own .... The countervailing consideration of whether the prospective plaintiff
'knew or should have known' through the exercise of reasonable diligence of his injury has al-
ways been closely intertwined with the 'discovery rule."') (citing Cart, 423 S.E.2d at 647-48;
Gaither, 487 S.E.2d at 908; and Harrison v. Seltzer, 268 S.E.2d 312, 314 (W. Va. 1980)).
63 See id. at 908 (discussing difference between Cart and Gaither).
64 See id. at 910.
65 Id.
66 See Donley v. Bracken, 452 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994) (patient informed infant died due to
lack of oxygen and believed it was due to negligence); see also Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104
(W. Va. 1996) (death of infant placed plaintiff on notice).
67 See, e.g., Morgan v. Grace Hosp., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965).
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The discovery rule also applies to wrongful death cases, which are sub-
ject to a two-year limitation of action.68 In Bradshaw v. Soulsby,69 the plaintiff
filed a wrongful death action within two years of the date of the report of au-
topsy of her deceased husband, but beyond two years from the date of death.7°
She sought the protection of the discovery rule, arguing she could not know the
reason for the death until the autopsy result was available. 71 The supreme court
agreed.72 In a decision authored by Justice Starcher, the court held:
In a wrongful death action, under the discovery rule, the statute
of limitation contained in [West Virginia Code section] 55-7-
6(d) [(1992)] begins to run when the decedent's representative
knows or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know
(1) that the decedent has died; (2) that the death was the result
of a wrongful act, neglect, or default; (3) the identity of the per-
son or entity who owed the decedent a duty to act with due care
and who may have engaged in conduct that breached that duty;
and (4) that the wrongful act, neglect or default of that person or
entity has a causal relation to the decedent's death.7 3
Bradshaw overruled Miller v. Romero,74 where the supreme court re-
fused to apply the "discovery rule" in extending the two-year limitation because
wrongful death was a statutory creation.75 Under Miller, wrongful death actions
had to be filed within two years of the death, unless the plaintiff proved fraudu-
lent concealment by the defendant.76 Bradshaw is significant because plaintiffs
can now assert they did not know a death was the result of malpractice, thereby
obtaining a much longer amount of time to investigate and file claims. Impor-
tantly, since Bradshaw interpreted the wrongful death act, the discovery rule
now applies to all wrongful death cases, not just those brought against health
care providers.77
68 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(d).
69 558 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 2001).
70 Id. at 684
71 Id.
72 Id. at 689
73 Id. at 688-89.
74 413 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1991).
75 Bradshaw, 558 S.E.2d at 688.
76 413 S.E.2d at 182.
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Under the discovery rule, mere ignorance is not enough. The rule does
not apply where the injury is immediately known, such as where an infant dies,
or where the patient was aware of the injury, even if the patient was not aware
of the malpractice.78 For example, in Findo v. Hamilton,79 the plaintiff filed suit
five years late. 80 The circuit court granted summary judgment on statute of limi-
tations grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that a question of fact existed as
to the date on which the statute of limitations should have begun, asserting that
the statute should not begin to run "until the Plaintiff becomes aware that the
action in question constituted malpractice. 81 In this regard, the plaintiff argued
that it was "possible to discover an injury without recognizing that malpractice
was committed. 82 The supreme court agreed with the plaintiffs theory, but
stated:
[T]he statute did not begin to run when she merely discovered
that additional treatment could possibly have been provided or
that Dr. Hamilton could have treated her more aggressively.
Rather, as in Renner [v. Asli],83 the statute began to run when
the appellant affirmatively recognized that malpractice had been
committed. 84
The plaintiff also asserted that her inability to recall exactly what the
physician told her about the malpractice "raise[d] an issue of material fact pre-
cluding summary judgment and requiring the taking of additional evidence."
85
The Findo court rejected this argument, stating:
A review of the appellant's testimony leads to the inescapable
conclusion that she was informed by Dr. Tyre in October 1987
that [the defendant's] actions constituted malpractice. While
some excerpts from the transcript do indicate the appellant's
confusion about particular aspects of her discussions regarding
[the defendant's] treatment, she repeatedly answers in the af-
78 See Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996) (death of infant placed plaintiff on
notice); Donley v. Bracken, 452 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994) (patient informed infant injured due to
lack of oxygen and believed it was due to negligence); Findo v. Hamilton, 428 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va.
1993) (knowledge of injury, but not malpractice).
79 428 S.E.2d 779 (W. Va. 1993).
80 Id. at 780-81.
81 Id. at 781
82 Id.
83 280 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981)
94 Findo, 428 S.E.2d at 781.
85 Id. at 781.
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firmative when questioned as to whether she was told in Octo-
ber 1987 that [the defendant's] actions constituted malprac-
tice.86
The court found "the appellant's own testimony rendered it impossible
to conclude that the appellant had filed her claim within the statute of limita-
tions., 87 Thus, not all statute of limitations cases involve jury issues. 88 "The
principles requiring presentation to the jury need not be stretched to the absurd-
ity."
89
B. Fraud or Collusion by Health Care Provider
The statute of limitations is also tolled for any period where the health
care provider or its representative has committed fraud or collusion by conceal-
ing or misrepresenting material facts about the injury.90 Inconclusive assertions
indicating that third parties, rather than named defendants, misrepresented mate-
rial facts do not satisfy the requirement that some action by the defendant pre-
vented plaintiff from knowing of the wrong at the time of such injury and, as
such, do not toll the statute.9' Moreover, evidence of fraudulent concealment by
one party will not necessarily be imputed to another party.92 This determination
is to be made on a case-by-case basis.
93
C. Claims by Minors
As discussed above, the MPLA placed a shorter limitation on the claims
of minors.94 West Virginia Code section 55-7B-4(b) shortens the statute of limi-
tations for actions for injuries to minors under ten years old, requiring that they
be brought within two years of injury or prior to the minor's twelfth birthday,
whichever is longer.95 The more general statute, West Virginia Code section 55-
2-15, requires actions to be brought by the representative of a minor up to the
age of majority and by the minor within two years of reaching "full age" except
86 Id. at 783.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. (citing Renner, 280 S.E.2d at 243).
90 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4(c).
91 Harrison v. Davis, 478 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1996).
92 See Pennington v. Bear, 488 S.E.2d 429 (W. Va. 1997).
93 See id.; see also Trafalgar House Const., Inc. v. ZMM, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2002).
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no case could be brought more than twenty years after the injury.9 6 A provision
identical to West Virginia Code section 55-7B-4(b) in the governmental tort
reform act was struck down as unconstitutional in Whitlow v. Board of Educa-
tion.97 The absolute twenty-year statute of repose on suits by minors and in-
competents was upheld in Donley v. Bracken.
98
Reviewing Cart, Gaither, and Bradshaw demonstrates that the discov-
ery rule truly is applied on a case-by-case basis. Counsel on both sides need to
carefully frame the issues and focus their arguments based on the many different
cases applying the rule.
D. Tolling Pre-filing Procedures
The 2002 amendments to the MPLA provide that a plaintiff may file
suit only after satisfying pre-filing obligations,99 including sending a notice of
claim and certificate of merit to the defendant1l° Sending the appropriate pre-
filing documents in a timely manner satisfies the statute of limitations in the
same fashion as filing a complaint under prior law.' 0 ' To the extent the pre-filing
process is completed well within the applicable statute of limitations, the claim-
ant has until the statute expires to file suit.102
Where the pre-filing process extends beyond the expiration of the stat-
ute of limitations, West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6(h) tolls the statute of
limitations while the pre-filing procedures are being followed. 103 Subsection (h)
states:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, any statute of
limitations applicable to a cause of action against a health care
provider upon whom notice was served for alleged medical pro-
fessional liability shall be tolled from the date of the mailing of
a notice of claim to thirty days following receipt of a response
to the notice of claim, thirty days from the date a response to the
notice of claim would be due, or thirty days from the receipt by
96 Id. § 55-2-15.
97 438 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1993).
98 452 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1994).
99 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(a) (2002).
100 Id. § 55-7B-6(b). These provisions will be discussed in detail later in this article.
101 Id. § 55-7B-6(h) (tolling of statute of limitations upon mailing of notice of claim and certifi-
cate of merit); see Johnson v. Nedeff, 452 S.E.2d 63 (W. Va. 1994) (complaint must be timely
received; mailing does not satisfy requirement of filing within the statute of limitations); Winston
v. Wood, 437 S.E.2d 767 (W. Va. 1993) (filing determined by date filed with clerk).
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the claimant of written notice from the mediator that the media-
tion has not resulted in a settlement of the alleged claim and that
mediation is concluded, whichever last occurs. If a claimant
has sent a notice of claim relating to any injury or death to more
than one health care provider, any one of whom has demanded
mediation, then the statute of limitations shall be tolled with re-
spect to, and only with respect to, those health care providers to
whom the claimant sent a notice of claim to thirty days from the
receipt of the claimant of written notice from the mediator that
the mediation has not resulted in a settlement of the alleged
claim and that mediation is concluded.' °4
Thus, suit is timely as long as it is filed within 30 days of the date the
defendant's response is sent or would be due (calculated from the date of the
certified mail receipt).' °5 The statute remains "tolled" during mediation, if re-
quested.' °6 Where mediation is requested, the complaint must be filed within
thirty days of written notice from the mediator of an unsuccessful mediation. 0 7
If only one of multiple defendants requests mediation, the statute is tolled with
respect to all defendants to whom the claimant sent a notice of claim. 108
IV. PRE-FILING OBLIGATIONS
Actions filed after March 1, 2002, are subject to the pre-filing proce-
dures established by HB 601.109 HB 601 requires a claimant to serve each
health care provider with a notice of claim and certificate of merit thirty days
before bringing suit.1 10 Both the notice and certificate must be timely sent
104 Id.
105 As an observation, an argument has been made that HB 601 "shortens" the statute of limita-
tions by thirty days because the certificate of merit must be filed thirty days before suit can be
filed. To the contrary, as long as the notice of claim and certificate of merit are served within the
statute of limitations, the statute is tolled for the pendency of the pre-filing process.




110 Other states have enacted certificate of merit legislation in medical negligence cases and in
other cases, such as professional negligence, products liability and sexual abuse. Jefferey A.
Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates of Merit?,
1997 BYU. L. REv. 537. Other states with varying degrees of certificate of merit requirements for
medical professional liability actions include: New York, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney
1991); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West
Supp. 1997); Illinois, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1997); Missouri, MO. ANN.
STAT. § 538.225 (West 1988); Texas, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon 1997);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912d (West Supp. 1997); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
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within the applicable statute of limitations; however, mailing the documents
tolls the statute of limitations."' Once served with these documents, the health
care provider has the option to request pre-suit mediation." 12 When mediation is
requested, the claimant has the right to depose the health care provider before or
during mediation."
13
These provisions are aimed at deterring the filing of actions without ex-
pert testimony and providing a mechanism for voluntary early settlement of
claims. 14 While other states have certificate of merit requirements, it appears
West Virginia may be the first to incorporate early mandatory mediation and
deposition.'15
For years, West Virginia law has required the introduction of expert tes-
timony to prove medical malpractice. 16 However, West Virginia Code section
55-7B-6(a) requires a preliminary showing of expert support before the action is
filed.' 17  Section 55-7B-6(a) is mandatory and states "no person may file a
medical professional liability action against any health care provider without
complying with the provisions of this section."' 18 As the language regarding the
certificate of merit is mandatory, failure to file requires dismissal of actions filed
in violation of section 55-7B-6(a). 119
ANN. § 145.682 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); and New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27
(West Supp. 1997).
III W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(h); id. § 55-7B-6(a); id. § 55-7B-4; id. § 55-7-6.
112 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(f) (2002).
113 Id. § 55-7B-6(g).
114 Commenting on the Illinois certificate of merit statute, one court stated the "provision is
designed to reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice suits that are filed and to elimi-
nate such actions at an early stage, before the expenses of litigation have mounted." Jackson v.
Michael Reese Hosp., 689 N.E.2d 205, 210 (I1l. App. Ct. 1998) (holding, however, that certificate
of merit statute did not apply to action based on spoliation of evidence).
115 The notice of claim and certificate of merit provisions are not as intrusive as more elaborate
malpractice panels seen in other states like Kansas, Virginia and Indiana. Where the provision
may have its most important effect is in cases where multiple defendants are named first, then
investigated and perhaps dropped later. In a sense, the certificate of merit formalizes an expert
screening process already used by experienced plaintiffs counsel. The tradeoff is the additional
cost to the plaintiff in securing the report as opposed to merely obtaining an oral or informal
evaluation. West Virginia has long had mediation in its trial court rules. See W. VA. TRiAL CT. R.
25.
116 See Banfi v. Am. Hosp. for Rehab., 529 S.E.2d 600 (W. Va. 2000); Short v. Appalachian
OH-9, 507 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1998); Fortney v. Al-Hajj, 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992);
McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 488 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1985).
117 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(a).
"18 Id.
119 Other courts have held that failure of plaintiffs to serve notice of claim and a screening of
merit prior to the filing of a medical professional liability claim against any health care provider
requires dismissal of the action. "[A] plaintiff who files a complaint without the affidavit of merit
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The notice of claim and certificate of merit must be served by certified
mail, with return receipt requested. 120 The notice of claim "shall include a state-
ment of the theory or theories of liability upon which a cause of action may be
based, together with a screening certificate of merit."' 121 The notice of claim and
certificate of merit must be timely served within the applicable statute of limita-
tions. 
122
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6(b) defines the requirements of the
certificate of merit:
The certificate of merit shall be executed under oath by a health
care provider qualified as an expert under the West Virginia
is subject to dismissal without prejudice." Barlett v. N. Ottawa Cmty. Hosp., 625 N.W.2d 470,
473 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); see also Frieson v. S. Fulton Med. Ctr., 564 S.E.2d 821 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (complaint was dismissed as to one defendant for plaintiffs failure to attach an expert affi-
davit to her complaint, as required by GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9 (2002)); Williams v. United
States, No. 4:01 CV 23, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10454 (Mich. July 17, 2001) (dismissal without
prejudice for failure to file certificate); Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minn., 645 N.W.2d 420 (Minn.
2002) ("Failure to comply with these requirements results, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal
with prejudice of each cause of action as to which expert testimony is required .... ); Mello v.
Giliberto, 73 S.W.3d 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming denial of plaintiffs request to stay the
proceedings to allow discovery on the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to file an expert
affidavit under MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (2000)); In re Collum & Carney Clinic Ass'n, 62
S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. App. 2001) (court "had a ministerial duty to dismiss the case with preju-
dice" for failure to furnish expert affidavit required by TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §
13.01(d) (Vernon 2002)); Forrest v. Danielson, 77 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App. 2002); Garcia v. Pales-
tine Mem'l Hosp., 2002 WL 192359 (Tex. App. 2002) (unpublished; affirming dismissal for fail-
ure to have causation expert). Courts have also denied motions to dismiss for lack of certificate of
merit. See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal for lack of
certificate for claims to which statute applied, but not to others); Familia v. Univ. Hosp., 796 A.2d
302 (N.J. 2002) (granting extension of time to file certificate); Martin v. Montefiore Med. Ctr.,
161 A.D.2d 526, (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (motion to dismiss for lack of certificate of merit denied
when defendant refused to provide medical records necessary for case); Barreiro v. Morais, 723
A.2d 1244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (dismissal for failure to comply with certificate va-
cated due to problems plaintiff had in obtaining legible records from defendants). Some courts
have struck down certificate of merit statutes as unconstitutional. Ohio struck down its tort reform
statute, including a requirement that pleadings alleging medical negligence include documentation
of consultation by an expert, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.42 (Anderson Supp. 1996), as viola-
tive of the court's rulemaking power. Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio
1994). A North Carolina appeals court struck down its certificate of merit statute as unconstitu-
tional. Sharpe v. Worland, 557 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. 2001).
120 Sending a notice by certified mail creates a rebuttable presumption of receipt. In a case
involving notice by certified mail pursuant to statute related to a trustee's sale of property, the
supreme court upheld summary judgment against the owner who denied he received a notice, even
though the return receipt contained his signature. Dunn v. Watson, 566 S.E.2d 305 (W. Va.
2002).
121 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(b) (2002).
122 Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a case filed as a sham
because it was filed the last day of the statute of limitations almost contemporaneously with a
voluntary dismissal to gain another year. Estrada v. Burnham, 341 S.E.2d 538 (N.C. 1986).
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rules of evidence and shall state with particularity: (1) the ex-
pert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care in issue;
(2) the expert's qualifications; (3) the expert's opinion as to
how the applicable standard of care was breached; and (4) the
expert's opinion as to how the breach of the applicable standard
of care resulted in injury or death. 123
A certificate of merit is required for each defendant health care provider, and
cannot be signed by an expert with a financial interest in the litigation. 
24
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6(c) also recognizes exceptions to
the certificate of merit requirement. Where the claimant asserts the action is one
for which expert testimony is not required, 125 "a statement specifically setting
forth the basis of the alleged liability of the health care provider in lieu of a
screening certificate of merit" is allowed.1 26 Another exception occurs "[i]f a
claimant or his or her counsel has insufficient time to obtain a screening certifi-
cate of merit prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations...
,,127 In that circumstance, the notice of claim shall inform the defendants that a
certificate of merit will be supplied within sixty days of the health care pro-
vider' s receipt of the notice of claim.
28
None of the pretrial submissions (i.e., the notice of claim and certificate
of merit) or results of mediation are later admissible "unless the court, upon
hearing, determines that failure to disclose the contents would cause a miscar-
riage of justice."' 129 Finally, West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6(b) provides
"[n]othing in this subsection may be construed to limit the application of rule
fifteen of the rules of civil procedure."' 
30
Upon receipt of the notice of claim and certificate of merit, the health
care provider must make written demand for mediation within thirty days. Fail-
ure to respond results in a waiver of the right to pre-suit mediation under the
statute, meaning the claimant can proceed to file suit.' 3 1 If requested, mediation
must be conducted within forty five days pursuant to Trial Court Rule 25, unless
123 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(b).
124 Id.
125 See McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 488 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1995) (certain nursing cases do
not require expert testimony).
126 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(c); see Shelton v. Penrose/St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 984 P.2d
623 (Colo. 1999) (no certificate of merit required where case not one requiring expert testimony
under Colorado law).
127 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(d) (2002).
128 Id.
129 Id. § 55-7B-6(i).
130 Id. § 55-7B-6(b).
131 Id. § 55-7B-6(h).
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portions of the rule are clearly inapplicable to pre-suit mediation or the supreme
court issues pre-filing mediation rules. 132 Where mediation is requested, the
claimant is entitled to take the deposition of the defendant health care pro-
vider.'
33
The notice of claim and certificate of merit requirements make the most
sense when viewed in the context of the narrow issue they were enacted to re-
solve. These provisions are focused on MPLA claims filed without expert re-
view, perhaps where the plaintiff hopes discovery will provide a basis for the
claim upon later review. 34 The pre-filing provisions may be most applicable in
those cases where the plaintiff "shotguns" defendants, essentially suing all
health care providers involved in the patient's care. Pre-filing provisions merely
require the plaintiff to procure expert testimony on the standard of care and cau-
sation in advance, which is precisely what West Virginia common and statutory
law require in order to allow submission of an MPLA case to a jury. 1
35
There will undoubtedly be litigation over the notice of claim and certifi-
cate of merit provisions. As with most statutes, a constitutional challenge is
likely. Courts will undoubtedly be asked to decide whether particular notices of
claim and certificates of merit comply with HB 601. As the pre-filing obligation
is mandatory, 136 a notice of claim or certificate of merit that does not comply
with the statute may be challenged upon the filing of the complaint. House Bill
601 does not affect either party's right to amend pleadings to add parties; how-
ever, the pre-filing process should proceed as to the "new" defendants. 137 If,
after following HB 601, a party seeks to add new defendants, the court should
grant leave to follow the provisions of HB 601. For example, a plaintiff or de-
fendant would file a motion for leave to serve notice of claim and certificate of
merit, and proceed with filing an amended or third party complaint once the
process is complete. Both scenarios could cause delay in the pending litigation,
but those not originally sued should not be stripped of the protection of HB
601.138
132 Id. § 55-7B-6(g).
133 This is probably the unique part of West Virginia's pretrial notice of claim and certificate of
merit statute. The trade off - deposition for mandatory mediation - is likely in place to prevent
automatic requests for mediation. A health care provider must make the tactical decision whether
early mediation is worth giving a deposition before there is any discovery. Nothing in the statute
prevents either side from instituting settlement discussions outside the context of the early manda-
tory mediation.
134 As an example, a plaintiff may feel forced to sue a particular physician because his or her
involvement is not clear from a review of the record. In that circumstance, the physician has an
early opportunity to clarify his or her involvement and avoid the filing of a civil action.
135 See infra Part V.F. 1. (discussing requirement of expert testimony).
136 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(a).
137 Id.
138 Since HB 601 expressly does not affect amendment of pleadings, an argument can be made
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An interesting situation arises with regard to cross claims and third
party claims based solely on the testimony of the plaintiff's expert. In a multi-
defendant MPLA case, the defendants are entitled by statute to apportionment of
fault by the jury. 139 This is significant in MPLA actions because a defendant
with less than 25 % of the fault apportioned by the jury is only severally liable.140
Where the plaintiff has served certificates of merit on each defendant, a defen-
dant who files a cross claim for contribution and indemnity should not have to
file a new certificate of merit because the cross claim is based on the statutory
right to contribution.'1
4
Third party actions probably require a different analysis. 43 A defendant
seeking contribution from an absent non-party tortfeasor must bring them into
the case by third party complaint, or potentially forgo the claim.'44 An argument
can be made that no "new" certificate of merit is required where the plaintiff's
expert is critical of the third party defendant. In that circumstance, the plain-
tiffs certificate of merit, or the deposition transcript of the plaintiffs expert,
served upon the third party defendant with a notice of claim by counsel should
satisfy HB 601. However, where there is no certificate of merit or testimony by
the plaintiffs expert against the potential third party defendant, the third party
plaintiff probably has to procure a certificate of merit and follow the HB 601
process before filing a third party claim.
While not addressing the pre-filing MPLA requirements, the supreme
court has affirmed summary judgment in a case where the third party plain-
tiff failed to produce evidence supporting his third party claim. In Wilkinson
v. Duff,145 the defendant physician was sued for negligently prescribing
that once suit is filed, the action is governed only by the Rules of Civil Procedure, meaning the
HB 601 pre-filing provisions do not apply to any cross or third party claims. How this provision
will be interpreted is unclear based on prior case law. While the supreme court has carved out
exclusive constitutional rulemaking powers related to evidence, see Mayhorn v. Logan Med.
Found., 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994), it has recognized that the legislature can prescribe proce-
dural matters, as a sort of peaceful constitutional co-existence. See Weirton Med. Ctr. v. Mazzone,
2002 W. Va. LEXIS 97 (W. Va. June 19, 2002) (legislature can mandate status conference). But
see Foster v. Sakhai, 559 S.E.2d 53 (W. Va. 2001) (discussing appealability of order granting new
trial).
139 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9(a) (2002).
140 Id. § 55-7B-9(b).
141 Whether an MPLA defendant is required to file a cross claim is a good question. There is
no language in W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9 requiring cross claims to preserve the statutory right to
contribution; instead, the language of the statute makes the apportionment of negligence manda-
tory. Confusion has arisen over the need to file cross claims in light of dicta in some court opin-
ions. See Woodrum v. Johnson, 559 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 2001).
142 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(c).
143 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 14.
14 Howell v. Luckey, 559 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 2001).
145 No. 30399, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 236 (W. Va. Dec. 5, 2002).
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phentermine to the plaintiff's decedent, in part because she was postpartum
and breastfeeding. The physician denied that the patient provided this in-
formation, and consistently maintained phentermine was safe and played no
role in her death. In his third party complaint, he asserted that the labeling
and warning inserts provided by the manufacturer did not address the risk of
prescribing the drug to postpartum and breastfeeding women. He argued:
if he had received proper warnings about the hazards of pre-
scribing phentermine to postpartum and breast feeding women,
he would have presented those hazards to [the patient] in the
oral and written information he provided, and would have al-
tered the questions contained in his medical history so that [the
patient] would have given this information to [him].
146
The physician therefore sought contribution from the manufacturer asserting the
product was defective and unreasonably dangerous for its intended use because
of the improper labeling and warning inserts. 147 As noted by the court, the phy-
sician was required to bring the manufacturer into the action for purposes of
contribution under Howell v. Luckey. 1
48
The court affirmed summary judgment because there was no evidence
that the labeling and warning inserts were insufficient or otherwise defec-
tive:
In the instant case, [the defendant physician] presented abso-
lutely no evidence of whether it was foreseeable to [the drug
manufacturers] that use of phentermine by women such as [the
patient] could cause spontaneous coronary artery dissection.
[The defendant physician] also did not present any evidence as
to the adequacy or inadequacy of the labels and warning inserts
provided by the manufacturer and distributor, and did not pre-
sent any evidence of what a proper label or warning insert
should contain.
149
Instead, the physician relied on the plaintiffs evidence to prove the products
liability claim. Plaintiff's evidence was similarly silent as to the warning, focus-
146 Id. at *8.
147 Id. at *7.
148 518 S.E.2d 873 (1999).
149 Wilkinson, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 236, at *14-*15.
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ing solely on the standard of care.150
Moreover, the Wilkinson court found no evidence of causation because
the physician admitted that prescribing the drug to a postpartum patient was a
breach of the standard of care and asserted that if the patient gave an accurate
history, he would not have prescribed the drug.' 51 The court found that the phy-
sician's deposition made it clear the labeling and warning inserts did not moti-
vate his dispensing of the drug to the plaintiffs decedent.
1 52
Claims for indemnity are different and should not require a certificate of
merit. For example, the plaintiff can sue a hospital for the negligence of an
emergency room physician not employed by the hospital, holding the hospital
liable under principles of ostensible agency, as established in Torrence v. Kus-
minsky 5 3 Where this occurs, particularly where the emergency room physician
is employed by a separate entity (which provides its own insurance), the hospital
should have the right to add the "ostensible agent" as a party to respond to the
claims of emergency room negligence without a "new" certificate of merit be-
cause the legal basis of the claim is implied indemnity arising from the plain-
tiffs claims. 154 If there is contractual indemnity between the parties, the basis
of the claim is express indemnity, not requiring a certificate of merit. 155 In ei-
ther circumstance, HB 601 provides flexibility to allow notice that the claim
does not require expert testimony.
V. LITIGATION OF MPLA CASES
A. The Complaint
Once the HB 601 pre-filing procedure is completed - whether by
mediation or waiver of mediation - the plaintiff may proceed to file suit.
5 6
Complaints, under West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, must contain a short,
plain statement of the claim. '57 In MPLA actions, the complaint may not state a
dollar amount in the ad damnum clause. West Virginia Code section 55-7B-5
states that "no specific dollar amount or figure may be included in the com-
plaint, but the complaint may include a statement reciting that the minimum
ISO Id. at *15.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 408 S.E.2d 684 (W. Va. 1991).
154 See Woodrum, 559 S.E.2d at 908.
155 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(c).
156 At this point, this article could veer into discussions of jurisdiction and venue; however,
those discussions are left to other articles.
157 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8.
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jurisdictional amount established for filing the action is satisfied." The defen-
dants have the right to request a statement of damages.
Any party defendant may at any time request a written state-
ment setting forth the nature and amount of damages being
sought. The request shall be served upon the plaintiff who shall
serve a responsive statement as to the damages sought within
thirty days thereafter. If no response is served within the thirty
days, the party defendant requesting the statement may petition
the court in which the action is pending to order the plaintiff to
serve a responsive statement.
58
B. Access to Medical Records
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6a provides for mandatory access to
medical records for both parties. Section 55-7B-6a(a) requires the parties to
exchange medical records within thirty days of the filing of the last answer. The
exchange of records is apparently intended to streamline the process in light of
difficulties encountered by both sides in obtaining records.' 5  Both parties are
required to provide, as if requested under Rule 34 of the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, "all medical records pertaining to the alleged act or acts of medical profes-
sional liability which: (1) are reasonably related to the plaintiffs' claim; and (2)
are in the parties' control."' 6°
This provision inures to the benefit of all parties, as it ensures that the
parties, within thirty days of the filing of the answer, are provided with all avail-
able medical records. The statute further states,
the plaintiff shall also provide releases for such other medical
records known to the plaintiff, but not under his or her control,
but which relate to the plaintiffs claim. If the action is one al-
leging wrongful death, the records shall be for the deceased ex-
cept inasmuch as the plaintiff alleges injury to himself or her-
self.
161
House Bill 601 provides a mechanism to protect records a party believes
are not reasonably related to the claim.162 Under section 55-7B-6a(c), the party
158 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-5.
159 Under W. VA. CODE § 16-29-1, the plaintiff is entitled to obtain copies of medical records
on written request with a release. HB 601 provides, for the plaintiff, a backup to this provision.
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6a(a); see also Keplinger v. VEPCO, 537 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. 2000).
160 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6a(a).
161 Id.
162 Id. § 55-7B-6a(c) (2002).
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receiving a request for records believed not to be reasonably related "shall pro-
vide written notice to the requesting party of the existence of such records and
schedule a hearing before the court to determine whether access should be pro-
vided."'
163
Subsection (d) provides a mechanism for obtaining records that have not
been produced:
If a party has reasonable cause to believe that medical records
reasonably related to the claim of medical negligence exists and
access have not been provided or a release has not been pro-
vided therefor, he or she shall give written notice thereof to the
party upon whom the request is made, and if said records are
not received within fourteen days of the written notice, attain a
hearing on the matter before the court.' 64
Moreover, subsection (e) provides that in the event of a hearing, the court at the
conclusion of the hearing "shall make a finding as to the reasonableness of the
party's request for or refusal to provide records and may assess costs pursuant to
the Rules of Civil Procedure."'
16
Viewed as a whole, these provisions seem to mirror the usual exchange
of records which occurs when lawyers choose to cooperate. These provisions
tend to eliminate the expense incurred when there is no cooperation and both
parties must issue subpoenas and take "record-keeper" depositions. However,
the provisions expressly afford protection where one side asserts that records
should or should not be obtained.
166
In Keplinger v. VEPCO,167 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vir-
ginia discussed, at length, application of West Virginia Code sections 57-5-4a to
-4j when obtaining hospital records by subpoena. In 1981 the West Virginia
Legislature enacted those statutory provisions, which relate to hospital records.
These sections have not been substantively amended since their original enact-
ment. 168 This statute places specific duties on attorneys and records custodians
related to obtaining certain hospital records. Acquiring authorization from the
patient allows counsel to avoid the requirements of the statute; however, in the
absence of an authorization, counsel would be well advised to review the specif-
ics of the statute. The Keplinger court noted that failure to follow the require-
163 Id.
164 Id. § 55-7B-6a(d).
165 Id. § 55-7B-6a(e).
166 Id.
167 537 S.E.2d 632 (W. Va. 2000).
168 W. VA. CODE § 57-5-4d was amended in 1991 to change the phrase "workmen's compensa-
tion" to "workers' compensation." 1991 W. Va. Acts Ch. 16.
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ments of West Virginia Code section 57-5-4 when obtaining hospital records by
subpoena may open counsel to a possible claim for tortious interference with the
physician/patient relationship.
169
. In Keplinger, the supreme court specifically addressed whether a law-
yer's failure to comply with West Virginia Code sections 57-5-4a to -4j may be
grounds for a cause of action for tortious interference with a physician/patient
relationship. 17 The court answered this question in reference to Morris v. Con-
solidation Coal Co..171 In Morris, the court recognized that a patient has a cause
of action against a third party who induces a physician to breach his fiduciary
relationship, under certain circumstances.172 The Keplinger court then distin-
guished the holding in Morris from Keplinger:
[T]he Morris Court expressly limited its holding to "unauthor-
ized, ex parte oral communications between an employer and
the treating physician of a workers' compensation claimant re-
garding confidential physician/patient information." Thus, by its
own terms, Morris would apply to a lawyer's failure to comply
with [West Virginia Code sections] 57-5-4a - 4j only if that
failure occurred in connection with a workers' compensation
case, and only where it involved an unauthorized ex parte oral
communication.
173
However, the court went on to suggest the possible future application of
Morris:
While, at some point, we may deem it appropriate to further ex-
tend our holding in Morris, we decline to do so in connection
169 537 S.E.2d at 641.
170 Id.
171 446 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1994).
172 In Morris the court stated:
A patient does have a cause of action against a third party who induces a phy-
sician to breach his fiduciary relationship if the following elements are met:
(1) the third party knew or reasonably should have known of the existence of
the physician-patient relationship; (2) the third party intended to induce the
physician to wrongfully disclose information about the patient or the third
party should have reasonably anticipated that his actions would induce the
physician to wrongfully disclose such information; (3) the third party did not
reasonably believe that the physician could disclose that information to the
third party without violating the duty of confidentiality that the physician
owed the patient; and (4) the physician wrongfully divulges confidential in-
formation to the third party.
446 S.E.2d at 649.
173 Keplinger, 537 S.E.2d at 641 (citation omitted).
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with the case at bar. Prior to our decision in the instant case, the
law was not clear with regard to the application of [West Vir-
ginia Code sections] 57-5-4a to -4j to obtaining hospital records
for inspection and copying only. Therefore, it could not have
been reasonably foreseeable to VEP and its attorneys that their
conduct in subpoenaing hospital records for inspection and
copying without following the provisions of [West Virginia
Code sections] 57-5-4a to -4j would give rise to a cause of ac-
tion. Under these circumstances, VEP should not be subjected
to a new cause of action.
74
Thus, the supreme court made it clear that attorneys issuing subpoenas for hos-
pital records must follow the provisions of West Virginia Code sections 57-5-4a
to -4j or risk a possible cause of action for tortious interference.
C. Mandatory Status Conference
Amended West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6 contains other changes
designed to expedite the resolution of medical professional liability cases. West
Virginia Code section 55-7B-6b(a) requires the court to convene a mandatory
status conference within sixty days after the appearance of the defendant. 75 For
pre-HB 601 actions, section 55-7B-6b(a) requires the conference be held no
sooner than nine nor later than twelve months after the last filed answer. 176 The
defendant has the duty to schedule the conference upon proper notice to the
plaintiff. 1
77
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6b(b) sets forth the subjects to be
discussed at the status conference, requiring the parties to "inform the court as to
the status of the action, the identification of contested facts and issues, the pro-
gress of discovery and the time necessary to complete discovery.' 78 According
to the statute, the plaintiff must advise the court whether the plaintiff intends to
proceed without an expert, whether the expert who signed the screening certifi-
cate will testify at trial or whether additional experts will be offered. 79 Under
174 Id.
175 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6b(a) (2002). The mandatory status conference was included in the
original MPLA. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(a) (1996) (amended 2001). House Bill 601 sets forth
the amended mandatory status conference proceeding in W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6b (2002). See
Daniel v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 544 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001) (holding that the confer-
ence is mandatory, and that plaintiff is entitled to reasonable time if the court decides expert is
required).
176 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(a) (2000) (amended 2001).
177 Id. § 55-7B-6b(a) (2002).
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the MPLA, if the court determined expert testimony was required, it had to pro-
vide a reasonable period of time for the plaintiff to obtain an expert witness.
80
House Bill 601 states that the court "shall determine whether the plaintiff may
proceed without an expert or otherwise establish dates for the disclosure of ex-
pert witnesses by both the plaintiff and all defendants."' 18' The new language
drops the "reasonable period of time" requirement if the court determines plain-
tiff needs an expert, substituting instead the establishment of deadlines. This
reflects the normal practice in the circuit courts.
The section 55-7B-6 conference is an important milestone in an MPLA
action, particularly as it relates to the necessity of expert testimony. In Daniel v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.182 and State ex rel. Weirton Medical Cen-
ter v. Mazzone, 83 the supreme court held that the statutory status conference
complements the normal status conference provided for in Rule 16 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 184
The plaintiff in Daniel was being moved to his room in a wheelchair
which broke, injuring him. 185 After suit was filed, the parties entered into a
scheduling order which contained deadlines for the identification of experts by
both sides. 186 Because plaintiffs admittedly did not identify a causation expert
within the time frame order deadline, the court granted summary judgment.'
87
The supreme court reversed summary judgment as "premature" because
the circuit court did not hold the mandatory status conference, or allow the
plaintiff a reasonable time to secure an expert witness on causation after deter-
mining expert testimony was mandatory, as required by West Virginia
Code section 55-7B-6(a)(2):
Through its grant of summary judgment simultaneous with its
decision concerning the need for an expert on the issue of
proximate cause, the trial court failed to comply with the man-
datory language of West Virginia Code § 55-7B-6(a)(2), which
requires the provision of a "reasonable period of time" for ex-
pert retention. Logic suggests that this mandate of requiring a
"reasonable period of time" must follow any determination by a
trial court regarding the need for an expert, and not precede
180 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(a)(2) (2000) (amended 2001).
181 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6b(b).
182 544 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001).
183 No. 30360, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 97 (June 19, 2002).
184 Rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs scheduling in civil
actions. State ex rel. Crafton v. Burnside, 528 S.E.2d 768, 772 (W. Va. 2000).
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such determination. Because the lower court failed to accord
Appellant any time whatsoever following its decision regarding
the need for an expert witness on proximate cause, we conclude
that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to
CAMC. 188
The unsuspecting plaintiff who is told he needs an expert gets a reason-
able time to obtain one. The Daniel court knew this, stating:
Not until this ruling of the trial court was it clear that the action
would be resolved pursuant to the provisions of the Medical Li-
ability Act or that an expert witness was required. While West
Virginia Code § 55-7B-6(a)(2) does not expressly address the
use of expert witnesses for proximate cause purposes, the dis-
cretion vested in the trial judge by this provision to make de-
terminations regarding the need for expert witness testimony
coupled with our prior decision in Short [v. Appalachian OH-
9189] compels the conclusion that upon a trial court's determina-
tion that an expert witness is required to prove standard of care
or proximate cause in an action brought under the Medical Li-
ability Act, a reasonable period of time must be provided for re-
tention of an expert witness. 190
Thus, the supreme court added Short's requirement that experts are necessary
for causation to section 55-7B-3, which mentions only plaintiffs standard of
care expert.
191
188 Id. at 908.
189 507 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1998).
190 Id. (citing Syl. Pt. 5, Short, 507 S.E.2d at 247).
191 The irony of Daniel is Justice Davis' observance that, had it not been an MPLA case, the
supreme court would have affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs violation of the schedul-
ing order. Id. at 909.
As demonstrated by the foregoing case law, precedent would appear to require
affirming the trial court in this case. Indeed, had this not been a medical mal-
practice case within the confines of [West Virginia Code] § 55-7B-6, under
the Rules of Civil Procedure we would be compelled to affirm the trial court's
decision since the court was correct in requiring plaintiff to use an expert.
However, the Rule 16(b) scheduling order in this case was qualified by the
application of [West Virginia Code] § 55-7B-6, which, as discussed below,
controls the issue of identifying a medical expert in actions for medical pro-
fessional liability.
Id. The supreme court affirmed dismissal of an MPLA action for plaintiff's repeated failure to
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Justice Davis concurred in Daniel, suggesting the mandatory status con-
ference should occur before the established deadlines for expert witnesses,
should involve a meaningful hearing on any expert issues, and should apply
only to medical experts.'
92
The mandatory status conference was further addressed in State ex rel.
Weirton Medical Center v. Mazzone. 193 In Mazzone, the parties agreed to a
scheduling order setting expert deadlines. After an agreed extension, the parties
identified expert witnesses and began squabbling. The circuit court struck a cau-
sation opinion offered by one of the defense experts based upon a late disclosure
of the opinion.' 94 Limiting each side to one liability expert, the circuit court
further ordered that if defendant physician testified he had not breached the
standard of care, he could not call a liability expert.195
Like Daniel, the supreme court reversed because the mandatory status
conference was not held.' 9  "[T]o further clarify" its decision in Daniel, the
Mazzone court held:
[T]he provisions of the Medical Professional Liability Act, W.
Va. Code §§ 55-7B-1 to -11, govern actions falling within its
parameters, subject to this Court's power to promulgate rules
for all cases and proceedings, including rules of practice and
procedure, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the West Vir-
ginia Constitution. We further hold that the necessity of expert
witnesses in medical malpractice cases must be resolved during
the mandatory status conference required by W. Va. Code § 55-
7B-6. Accordingly, dates set forth in an initial scheduling order
entered by the court pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 16 for the iden-
tification of expert witnesses are not controlling. 197
Moreover, the Mazzone court expanded the scope of the mandatory status con-
ference to include defense experts, stating that "neither the plaintiff nor the de-
fendant in an action filed pursuant to the Medical Professional Liability Act
shall be required to disclose expert witnesses before the status conference re-
quired by West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6 has been held."' 98
192 Justice Davis' thoughtful concurrence in Daniel, describing in some detail the mandatory
status conference, is a must read for MPLA litigators. 544 S.E.2d at 909.
193 No. 30360, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 97 (June 19, 2002).
194 Id. at *8.
195 Id. at *7.
196 Id. at *24.
197 Id. at *18 (citation omitted).
198 Id. at *20-*21.
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After Daniel, most circuit courts across the state reacted by requiring
the scheduling of mandatory status conferences absent a stipulation by the par-
ties that expert testimony on the standard of care is required in particular cases.
Mazzone suggests the conference cannot be waived. 199 Even though the burden
is on the defense to initiate the conference, Mazzone reaffirms that it is manda-
tory, and that section 55-7B-6 requires a meaningful status conference at which
expert testimony on both sides of the liability and causation issues shall be dis-
cussed.2 ° With the HB 601 amendments moving the conference to sixty days,
instead of nine to twelve months, this dialogue will take place earlier in the ac-
tion, which will help parties avoid the kind of close to trial squabbling seen in
both Daniel and Mazzone.
20 1
D. Mandatory Mediation
In addition to the optional pre-suit mediation, circuit courts are directed
by HB 601 to order mandatory mediation in all MPLA actions.2 °2 Mandatory
mediation is consistent with one goal of HB 601, which is to identify and re-
solve actions early to reduce cost.20 3 Most circuit courts around the state already
require the parties to mediate, regardless of the type of civil action, so this pro-
vision may not signal much of a change in everyday practice. For physicians
with insurance policies that require consent to settlement, the mandatory media-
tion provision forces the issue, requiring participation in mediation even though
the physician does not consent to settlement.204 Timing of mediation in MPLA
cases is also a critical issue because of the importance of expert testimony on
standard of care and causation to the ultimate evaluation of the case for settle-
ment by both sides.
199 Id. at *15-*16.
200 Id.
201 Generally, a trial court has the discretion to control its docket. See McCoy v. Charleston
Area Med. Ctr., Inc. 557 S.E.2d 378 (W. Va. 2001) (affirming dismissal for violation of schedul-
ing order deadline for experts); Kiser v Caudill, 557 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 2001) (finding initial
ruling excluding late-disclosed expert appropriate, but also finding abuse of discretion in not al-
lowing expert, since trial was then continued for almost two years). For cases on bifurcation,
compare Rohrbaugh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 30441, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 166 (Oct. 11,
2002), in which the trial court did not err in bifurcating punitive damages issues, with State ex rel.
Crafton v. Burnside, 528 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 2000), in which the circuit court's refusal to allow
the plaintiffs to withdraw an agreement to a bifurcated proceeding was reversed.
202 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6b(b) (2002).
203 See Rita Lowery Gitchell & Andrew Plattner, Mediation: A Viable Alternative to Litigation
for Medical Malpractice Cases, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 421 (1999).
204 In this regard, parties can be forced to mediate, but not ordered to settle or make offers. W.
VA. TRJAL CT. R. 25.11. An important case about enforcing agreements reached at mediation is
Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 2002).
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E. Sanctions
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6a further empowers the circuit
courts to sanction frivolous claims or defenses. If the court finds that either
party is pursuing frivolous or dilatory claims or defenses "for which there is no
reasonable basis in fact or law," it may direct in final judgment that prevailing
party recover reasonable litigation expenses, not including attorney's fees.205
This provision mirrors Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,
fees 206except that it excludes attorney's fees as a sanction. Under Daniel, procedural
legislation co-exists with the Rules of Civil Procedure, but the interrelationship
between West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6 and Rule 11 is at best unclear.20 7
F. Experts
Two issues are important in relation to expert testimony in MPLA ac-
tions. The first is the necessity of expert testimony, which will be resolved at
the mandatory status conference, discussed above. The second issue is the
qualification of an expert to offer testimony in a particular case. In determining
the necessity of experts, and the qualifications necessary to testify, several su-
preme court decisions are important and instructive.0 8
1. Necessity of Expert Testimony
The necessity of expert testimony is a threshold issue in MPLA cases.
Under the MPLA, experts are generally required to prove the breach of the stan-
dard of care and causation. Section 55-7B-7 provides that "[tihe applicable
standard of care and a defendant's failure to meet said standard, if at issue, shall
be established in medical professional liability cases by the plaintiff by testi-
mony of one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses if required by
the court. '209 Thus, circuit courts have the discretion to determine whether ex-
205 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6a(f) (2002).
206 Id.
207 See generally Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. & W. Scott Campbell, Rule 11 Sanctions in State and
Federal Courts in West Virginia, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 417 (1988). Whether sanctions are a mean-
ingful threat is a good question. The imposition of sanctions against a party and counsel who sued
the expert witnesses who testified in her criminal trial was reversed in Davis v. Wallace, 565
S.E.2d 386 (W. Va. 2002). Conversely, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of an MPLA
action for the plaintiff's continued refusal to adhere to scheduling orders although the basis of the
motion was not Rule 11. McCoy v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 378 (W. Va.
2001).
208 See generally State ex rel. Ward v. Hill, 489 S.E.2d 24 (W. Va. 1997), for a discussion of
requirements for formal sharing agreements among defendants in order to preserve the right to use
experts at trial.
209 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-7 (emphasis added).
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perts are necessary in a particular case.2t ° Causation must also be proven by
expert testimony2 m' In this regard, the MPLA is consistent with prior law.212
Two cases on the necessity of expert testimony stand out as defining the
extent of the circuit court's discretion: McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hospital2 13 and
Banfi v. American Hospital for Rehabilitation.
2 14
The issue in McGraw was whether the plaintiff was required to use ex-
pert testimony to prove a claim against the hospital's nurses for allowing a pa-
tient to fall out of bed. Reversing summary judgment for the defendant, the
supreme court reached the conclusion that the case involved "routine" hospital
care within the common knowledge of jurors.21 5 Echoing the pre-MPLA deci-
sion in Totten v. Adongay,216 the court stated:
In medical malpractice cases where lack of care or one of skill
is so gross, so as to be apparent, or the alleged breach relates to
noncomplex matters of diagnosis and treatment within the un-
derstanding of lay jurors by resort to common knowledge and
experience, failure to present expert testimony on the accepted
standard of care and degree of skill under such circumstances is
not fatal to a plaintiff's prima facie showing of negligence.
217
Moreover, "[t]he standard of nonmedical, administrative, ministerial or routine
care in a hospital need not be established by expert testimony because the jury is
competent from its own experience to determine and apply a reasonable-care
standard.,
218
The McGraw court also found the circuit court was clearly wrong in rul-
ing that the plaintiff did not have an expert on the standard of care with respect
to the fall. 219 According to the supreme court, the plaintiffs expert opined that
the hospital violated the standard of care by failing to have the side rails up on
210 McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 488 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1997).
211 Daniel v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 544 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001).
212 See, e.g., Neary v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 460 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995); Roberts
v. Gale, 139 S.E.2d 272 (W. Va. 1964).
213 488 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1997).
214 529 S.E.2d 600 (W. Va. 2000).
215 McGraw, 488 S.E.2d at 395.
216 337 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1985)
217 McGraw, 488 S.E.2d at 394.
218 Id. at 396 (quoting Cramer v. Theda Clark Mem'l Hosp., 172 N.W.2d 427, 428 (Wis.
1969)).
219 Id. at 397-98.
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the plaintiff's bed, resulting in a fall.220 There was also a second incident, where
the plaintiff was dropped, as to which the court found the facts "susceptible to a
reasonable standard of care that can be determined, without an expert, by the
jury., 221 Procedurally, the McGraw court remanded the case for a determination
of whether the second incident involved complex management issues, stating
that "the trial court may find at a pretrial hearing that expert testimony is neces-
sary on this incident, should the defendant proffer satisfactory evidence that this
incident involved complex management issues. 222
The McGraw court's analysis of the necessity of expert testimony was
followed in Banfi v. American Hospital for Rehabilitation,223 a wrongful death
action arising from injuries sustained by a patient in a bed fall. Suing the hospi-
tal and physician, the plaintiff alleged failure to restrain, failure to prevent the
fall, and improper diagnosis and treatment of her injuries. The plaintiff did not
identify expert witnesses on either issue, and the circuit court granted summary
judgment for the physician.224
Addressing whether proving the failure to restrain a patient required ex-
pert testimony, the supreme court stated:
[It is generally acknowledged that such testimony is necessary
when the allegation in question involves a technical medical de-
cision, which is not within the ordinary and common knowledge
of the average lay juror. Our research indicates that the major-
ity of jurisdictions considering the question of whether restrain-
ing a patient is, in fact, a technical medical decision have con-
cluded that it is a complex determination, and therefore expert
testimony is required to educate the jury as to the appropriate
standard of care.225
220 Id. at 397.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 398. McGraw is based on the assumption, derived from other cases, that some nurs-
ing care does not require the exercise of professional judgment. "[R]egistered or licensed practi-
cal nurse[s]," however, are expressly included in the MPLA definition of "health care providers."
W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-2 (2002). Moreover, the West Virginia Code recognizes nursing as a pro-
fession, requiring licensure and continuing education. See id. § 30-7-1(b) (2002).
223 529 S.E.2d 600 (W. Va. 2000).
224 Id. at 604.
225 Id. at 606 (citation omitted). For those with bed fall cases, here is a helpful list of the opin-
ions cited by the supreme court as supporting the proposition that the decision to restrain requires
expert testimony. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Leonard v. Providence Hosp.,
590 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1991); Sexton v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 631 S.W.2d 270 (Ark.
1982); Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Martin, 454 A.2d 306 (D.C. 1982); Butler v. Caldwell Mem'l
Hosp., 412 P.2d 593 (Idaho 1966); Taylor v. City of Beardstown, 491 N.E.2d 803 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986); Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Bennett v. Winthrop Cmty. Hosp.,
489 N.E.2d 1032 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); Waatti v. Marquette Gen. Hosp., Inc., 329 N.W.2d 526
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Similarly, as to the negligent diagnoses and treatment claim, the Banfi court
stated, "whether a defendant has properly diagnosed and/or treated a patient
entrusted to his/her care necessitates expert testimony because such a question is
outside the common knowledge of the typical jury., 226 The supreme court con-
cluded, therefore, that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
expert testimony on the restraint, diagnosis and treatment issues, and affirmed
summary judgment for the physician. 27
The Banff court reversed the summary judgment for the hospital on the
issue "that fit was] negligent in failing to prevent [the plaintiff's] fall. 228 First,
the court noted the conflicting facts in the case. The plaintiffs alleged that the
patient repeatedly called for help, was ignored by the nurses, and fell as she
walked to the bathroom. The defendant, however, contended that the patient
was found after the fall, was apologetic, and said she did not call for help so as
not to bother anyone. The court found these factual conflicts precluded sum-
mary judgment.229
The court again stated that expert testimony is not generally required
against nurses in bed fall cases. 230 Relying heavily on McGraw, the court ob-
served:
[C]laims of negligence arising from a hospital patient's fall gen-
erally do not require expert testimony as the applicable standard
of care is within the common knowledge of the average lay
jury. As the case sub judice is remarkably similar to our prior
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam); Reifschneider v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 387 N.W.2d 486
(Neb. 1986); Carrigan v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 178 A.2d 502 (N.H. 1962); Mossman v. Albany
Med. Ctr. Hosp., 311 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); Bronaugh v. Harding Hosp., Inc., 231
N.E.2d 487 (Ohio 1967); Murphy v. Schwartz, 739 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Kujawski
v. Arbor View Health Care Ctr., 407 N.W.2d 249 (Wis. 1987).
226 Banf, 529 S.E.2d at 608; see District of Columbia v. Mitchell, 533 A.2d 629 (D.C. 1987);
Spring Creek Living Ctr. v. Sarrett, 890 S.W.2d 598 (Ark. 1995); Donovan v. Iowa, 445 N.W.2d
763 (Iowa 1989); Smith v. Weaver, 407 N.W.2d 174 (Neb. 1987); Ramage v. Cent. Ohio Emer-
gency Servs., Inc., 592 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1992); Stowe v. McHugh, 699 A.2d 279 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1997); Saxton v. Toole, 608 N.E.2d 233 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992); Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey
Med. Ctr., 444 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd as modified, 457 N.W.2d 188 (Minn.
1990); Kelly v. Berlin, 692 A.2d 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Redding v. Saunders, 625
N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Murphy v. Schwartz, 739 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1986); Reeves v. Geigy Pharm., Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); cf. Espinosa v. Little
Co. of Mary Hosp., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
227 Banfi, 529 S.E.2d at 607.
228 Id. at 608.
229 Id. at 607. The existence of conflicting facts, however, does not excuse the plaintiff from
producing expert testimony where required. See Goundry v. Wetzel-Saffle, 568 S.E.2d 5, 8-9 (W.
Va. 2002).
230 Banfi, 529 S.E.2d at 607.
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decision of McGraw, we instruct the circuit court to refer to
this precedent during its reconsideration of this issue. 31
Interesting in McGraw and Banfi is the supreme court's reliance on de-
cisions from other jurisdictions as to whether restraint, prevention of fall, and
diagnosis/treatment were generally held to be technical medical decisions re-
quiring expert testimony, as opposed to an evaluation of the record for expert
opinion about the nature of the decision making process.232 The court's remand
for reconsideration of the issue in both cases strongly suggests that absent evi-
dence from the defendant that the acts in question are complex, requiring expert
testimony, it will be an abuse of discretion for circuit courts to require experts in
bed fall cases.233
Although both Banfi and McGraw focus on bed fall cases, the analysis
of the necessity of expert testimony is instructive for any MPLA case. Where
the treatment at issue involves complex or medical decisions, expert testimony
is required. If it is "routine" then expert testimony is not required.
In Withrow v. West Virginia University Hospitals,234 the supreme court
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant hospital because of the lack of
expert testimony. The issue in Withrow was whether the nurses breached the
standard of care by failing to give platelets to a patient pursuant to a physician's
order. The court found no evidence the nurses violated the order present in the
chart. Further, the plaintiffs expert witness could neither testify that the nurses
failed to follow orders nor offer any criticism of the hospital's policies or proce-
dures.2 35 "Consequently, [the plaintiffs] lacked evidence to prove an essential
element required to establish a prima facie case of medical negligence against
[the hospital]. Therefore, [the hospital] was entitled to summary judgment.,
236
Several other cases focus on the requirement of expert testimony for
complex medical issues. In Goundry v. Wetzel-Saffle, 237 the plaintiff failed to
produce expert testimony to support the allegation that the defendant, who was
231 Id. at 608 (citation omitted).
232 Procedurally, Banfi was a "no expert" summary judgment case, so there was no record on
the nature of the decision making process in the areas analyzed. In McGraw the court stated that
"[allthough the defendant has contended on appeal that complex management issues are involved
in this case, the defendant has not articulated such issues." McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 488
S.E.2d 389, 396 (W. Va. 1997). It is clear from Banfi and McGraw that the bare assertion that
experts are needed in bed fall cases will not succeed. To the extent the issue is still alive, the
defendant seeking to require expert testimony must make a record that the decision in question
required the exercise of professional judgment, as opposed to being "routine" care.
233 See Banfi, 529 S.E.2d at 608; McGraw, 488 S.E.2d at 397-98.
234 No. 30463, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 218 (Dec. 3, 2002).
235 Id. at *11-*12.
236 Id. at *12.
237 568 S.E.2d 5 (W. Va. 2002).
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treating the plaintiff for menstrual problems, failed to diagnose and treat the
plaintiffs pregnancy. The physician asserted that she did not perform a preg-
nancy test because the plaintiff claimed that she could not be pregnant. How-
ever, the plaintiff was pregnant, later delivered a premature infant, and brought
suit.
238
The supreme court affirmed summary judgment because of the lack of
expert testimony.239
Under [West Virginia Code section] 55-7B-7 (2000), it is ex-
pressly provided that "[t]he applicable standard of care and a
defendant's failure to meet said standard, if at issue, shall be es-
tablished in medical professional liability cases by the plaintiff
by testimony of one or more knowledgeable, competent expert
witnesses if required by the court." In other words, in medical
malpractice cases "the circuit court has the discretion to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff is required to obtain an expert wit-
ness[.] ''1240
The Goundry court also rejected the plaintiff's common knowledge ar-
gument. The supreme court recited the analysis of the circuit court's reasoning
and stated:
Whether or not a pregnancy test is given to a patient who has
denied the possibility of pregnancy is a standard that must be
established by an expert and is not within the common knowl-
edge of a lay juror. Also, whether or not a pregnancy test
should have been offered is a medical question that relates to
standard of care and requires expert opinion.241
238 Id. at 7.
239 Id. at 9-10.
240 Id. at 8 (quoting Short v. Appalachian OH-9, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 124, 131 (W. Va. 1998)).
The court further cited Syllabus Point 9 of McGraw v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 488 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va.
1997), for the proposition that "[t]he standard of nonmedical, administrative, ministerial or routine
care in a hospital need not be established by expert testimony, because the jury is competent from
its own experience to determine and apply a reasonable care standard." Goundry, 568 S.E.2d at 9
n.12.
241 Goundry, 568 S.E.2d at 9 (citing Banfi v. American Hosp. for Rehab., 529 S.E.2d 600 (W.
Va. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for defendants, in part, when plaintiff failed to present
expert testimony in support of its claims that defendants were negligent by failing to restrain pa-
tient and by allegedly misdiagnosing her injuries after her fall); Moats v. Preston County
Comm'n, 521 S.E.2d 180 (W. Va. 1999) (requiring plaintiff to utilize a medical expert witness to
establish that defendant deviated from the standard of care with regard to its actions during an
involuntary commitment proceeding); Hapchuck v. Pierson, 495 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1997) (af-
firming summary judgment when plaintiff failed to produce medical expert testimony on the issue
of a physician's duty to warn); and Neary v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 460 S.E.2d 464 (W.
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The plaintiff argued that the dispute of fact over whether the pregnancy
test was offered prohibited summary judgment. The court held that in MPLA
actions where experts are required, conflicts in the underlying facts do not pre-
clude the grant of summary judgment for failure to produce a necessary ex-
pert.
2 42
Pleasants v. Alliance Corp.24 3 addressed, among several issues, the trial
judge's decisions to allow the defendants to call an expert disclosed seven
months after the agreed deadline and to call two experts as cumulative evidence
of the standard of care. The court rejected the argument that the trial judge
should not have allowed the late disclosed expert, stating,
While this court does not condone non-compliance by any party
with discovery deadlines, we agree with the trial court's deci-
sion that scheduling orders were not meant to be used in a puni-
tive fashion to prevent one party from adapting their case strat-
egy to fit a plaintiff s altered theory of the case.244
Importantly, the court found the plaintiff was not surprised by the testimony and
therefore not prejudiced by the late disclosure.245 The court was unable to ad-
dress the cumulative evidence argument because a trial transcript relevant to the
issue was not filed.24
Therefore, as to expert testimony, the supreme court's decisions affirm
the general requirement that experts are necessary to establish negligence by
Va. 1995) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff failed to submit medical
expert testimony in support of his failure to warn claim)).
242 Goundry, 568 S.E.2d at 8.
Obviously the two competing theories present disputed material issues of fact.
Under our general rule summary judgment would be inappropriate when a
case presents material issues of fact that are in dispute. However, medical
malpractice cases present an exception to the general rule. Our cases have
made clear that "[w]hen the principles of summary judgment are applied in a
medical malpractice case, one of the threshold questions is the existence of
expert witnesses opining the alleged negligence." Thus, once a trial court
makes the discretionary determination that a plaintiff must produce a qualified
medical expert in a medical malpractice case, underlying disputed material is-
sues of fact cannot be reached until the plaintiff has produced a qualified
medical expert.
Goundry, 568 S.E.2d at 9 n. 10 (citations omitted).
243 543 S.E.2d 320 (W. Va. 2000).
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physicians. This principle, however, does not necessarily extend to decisions of
other health care providers, particularly nurses. In more exacting terms, experts
are necessary in cases involving the application of medical judgment, but not for
acts considered routine, nonmedical, or "ministerial." McGraw and Banfi dem-
onstrate that where the plaintiff relies on the common knowledge doctrine, the
defendant needs to make a record demonstrating that the medical issue is one of
complex professional judgment requiring expert testimony.
A different issue on the requirement of experts is presented when the
plaintiff seeks to proceed under res ipsa loquitur,24 asserting that the injury
itself proves the negligence. Res ipsa loquitur has narrow application in MPLA
cases. In Farley v. Meadows,248 the court stated:
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked where the
existence of negligence is wholly a matter of conjecture and the
circumstances are not proved, but must themselves be pre-
sumed, or when it may be inferred that there was no negligence
on the part of the defendant. The doctrine applies only in cases
where defendant's negligence is the only inference that can rea-
sonably and legitimately be drawn from the circumstances. 249
Farley involved a failed sterilization. The evidence showed the failure
could have been either a surgical error, or simply a complication of the sur-
gery;250 thus, the plaintiff did not produce an expert, and the supreme court af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendant. 25' Similarly, in Neary v. Charles-
ton Area Medical Center, Inc.,252 the supreme court rejected plaintiffs attempt
247 Syl. Pt. 5, Davidson's Inc. v. Scott, 140 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1965).
248 404 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1991).
249 Syl. Pt. 2, Farley, 404 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Syl. Pt. 5, Scott, 140 S.E.2d at 809).
250 See id. at 538-39. The medical issue in Farley was the failure of a sterilization because the
silastic band placed on the plaintiff's fallopian tube came off. The evidence showed it could not
have been placed in the first place, or improperly placed, or fallen off naturally. See id. at 539.
251 Id. at 539-40.
Ms. Farley had ample time to retain an expert, and failed to do so. She claims
that there is a "conspiracy of silence" among medical professionals, and, of
course, there is an understandable reluctance among doctors to testify against
fellow doctors with whom they must work every day. However, it is obvious
from the abundance of medical malpractice cases that go to trial around the
United States, and from the profusion of medical experts advertising their ser-
vices in the back of legal magazines, that many doctors will gladly don their
boxing gloves for a reasonable fee and testify about malpractice matters away
from their own home towns.
Id.
252 460 S.E.2d 464 (W. Va. 1995).
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to avoid using an expert by relying upon res ipsa loquitur, stating "the doctrine
does not apply under the circumstances of this case because [the patient's surgi-
cal] infection could have occurred without anyone's negligence. 253
Expert testimony in informed consent cases is also an important issue.
In Neary, the court stated that experts are not required to establish the scope of
the duty to disclose under the "patient need" standard adopted in Syllabus Point
5 of Cross v. Trapp.254 However, the inquiry does not end there. Relying on
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-7, the supreme court stated:
"Although expert medical testimony is not required under the
patient need standard to establish the scope of a physician's
duty to disclose medical information to his or her patient, expert
medical testimony would ordinarily be required to establish cer-
tain matters including (1) the risks involved concerning a par-
ticular method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of treat-
ment, (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of treat-
ment, and (4) the results likely to occur if the patient remains
untreated. 255
Thus, while no expert is required to establish that a physician is required
to obtain consent as judged by the patient need standard, the plaintiff must have
expert testimony to prove the appropriate underlying information. 6 As a prac-
tical matter, this may very well be a distinction without a difference, as in-
formed consent cases cannot proceed without an expert witness.
2. Expert Qualifications
With respect to the qualification of experts, the MPLA specifically re-
quires:
253 Id. at 467; see Walton v. Given, 215 S.E.2d 647, 648 (W. Va. 1975).
254 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982); see Neary, 460 S.E.2d. at 468.
255 Neary, 460 S.E.2d. at 468 (quoting Syl. Pt. 5, Cross, 294 S.E.2d at 448); see also Adams v.
El-Bash, 338 S.E.2d 381 (W. Va. 1985). While not decided under the MPLA, Belcher v. Charles-
ton Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992), is an important informed consent case. In
Belcher, the court held that a physician could be held liable for failure to obtain informed consent
where a minor's parents consented to medical treatment if the minor was "mature." 422 S.E.2d at
835-38. Whether a child is a "mature minor" is a question of fact ... depending upon the age,
ability, experience, education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment... [and] the conduct
[or] demeanor of the child at the time of the procedure ....I d. at 838.
256 See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that under
New Jersey's "prudent patient" standard, plaintiff alleging lack of informed consent must produce
qualified expert testimony to establish that the risk cited was one that the defendant should have
been aware of because it was known to the medical community at the time).
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(a) The opinion is actually held by the expert; (b) the opinion
can be testified to with reasonable medical probability; (c) such
expert possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled
with knowledge of the applicable standard of care... ; (d) such
expert maintains a current license to practice medicine in one of
the states of the United States; and (e) such expert is engaged or
qualified in the same or substantially similar medical field as
defendant health care provider.257
These provisions were likely included in the MPLA to address concerns about
"all purpose" experts, i.e., doctors who either testify outside their specialty or
simply testify for a living without clinical practice.
These requirements were struck down as unconstitutional. The "same
or similar specialty" requirement was initially addressed in Gilman v. Choi,258
where the court held it was an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to require
plaintiff s expert to have the same board certification as the defendant physician.
Then, in Fortney v. Al-Hajj,259 the court held that experience in treating the type
of injury at issue in a case satisfies the "same or similar field" requirement, find-
ing that a surgeon could testify as to the standard of care of an emergency room
physician. Finally, in Mayhorn v. Logan Medical Foundation,260 the supreme
court struck down the "same or similar" requirement as violative of its constitu-
tional rulemaking power. The court held the Legislature cannot dictate eviden-
tiary requirements because it has "paramount authority" under the constitution
to adopt rules of evidence. 26' Accordingly, the qualifications of experts in
MPLA actions are governed by Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evi-
dence, which provides, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 262
The approach of the supreme court to expert witnesses in MPLA actions
has been to lean toward admissibility where there is a minimal showing of quali-
fications, determined on a case-by-case basis. 263 Once the expert meets the
257 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-7 (2002).
258 406 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1991).
259 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
260 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994).
261 See Hicks v. Ghaphery, 571 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2002); Meadows v. Meadows, 468 S.E.2d
309 (W. Va. 1996).
262 W. VA. R. EVID. 702.
263 See Mayhorn, 454 S.E.2d at 94.
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threshold, deficiencies in qualifications are fodder for cross-examination. Illus-
trative is the court's discussion in Fortney v. AI-Hajj:
264
While [the defendant] was indeed practicing in the emergency
room, it must be acknowledged that the medical subject we are
concerned with is not simply the general practice of medicine,
but rather the specific issue of treatment of patients with block-
ages of the nature of that suffered by the Appellee. Conse-
quently, the emphasis must be on whether the proffered expert
... had the requisite experience to testify with regard to that lat-
ter issue. While [he] only practiced in an emergency room set-
ting when specifically needed for surgery, he had handled many
impacted food cases during his career.
A physician's experience may qualify him to testify regarding
areas other than his board certified specialty. The fact that a tes-
tifying expert physician may not have precisely the same spe-
cialty as a physician defendant does not disqualify that testify-
ing physician as an expert regarding the standard of care to be
employed by the physician defendant. By emphasizing the fact
that [plaintiffs expert] had not actually practiced emergency
medicine, [the defendant] is hedging the issue slightly. The sali-
ent inquiry is to what extent [the expert] is qualified under West
Virginia Code § 55-7B-7 to testify as an expert on the issue of
[the defendant's] standard of care in treating a patient suffering
an impacted food blockage. Based upon the foregoing, we con-
clude that [the expert] was qualified to provide expert testimony
on the issue of the standard of care of a physician rendering as-
sistance to a patient suffering from an impacted food blockage.
Any shortcomings which the Appellant believed existed in
[plaintiffs expert's] credentials could have properly been the
subject of cross-examination.
265
Vigorous cross-examination will not necessarily "knock out" the plain-
tiffs expert. In Graham v. Wallace,26 the plaintiff alleged the defendant negli-
gently installed an implant in her jaw. After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the
defendant appealed the circuit court's refusal to grant judgment as a matter of
law because the plaintiffs expert testimony was insufficient to allow a jury to
find a breach of the standard of care.267 The supreme court found that the plain-
264 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
265 Id. at 270-71 (emphasis added).
266 538 S.E.2d 730 (W. Va. 2000).
267 Id. at 731.
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tiffs expert direct examination was sufficient to inform the jury as to the ex-
pert's opinion of both the required standard of care and his opinion that the de-
fendant breached the standard of care.268
The fact the expert was vigorously and successfully cross-examined did
not require a directed verdict.
As both a matter of law and as a practical matter, a trial court
viewing the evidentiary sufficiency of a party's prima facie case
- or an appellate court assessing the sufficiency of evidence
where a jury has returned a verdict for a party (as we are doing
in the instant case) - simply cannot be required to dissect, ana-
lyze, or weigh a party's evidence through the lens of what oc-
curred in cross-examination of a party's witnesses, or of what
evidence the opposing party put on in rebuttal - to determine
whether a litigant made a sufficient evidentiary case to go to a
jury. Such dissection, analysis and weighing would invade the
province of the jury. If in the instant case - as the trial court
found and we agree - the plaintiffs case in chief through his
witnesses' direct testimony and other evidence established a
prima facie violation of the standard of care, then the plaintiff
met his burden so as to permit submitting that issue to the jury -
without regard to how the plaintiffs case-in-chief might have
been weakened by the defense through cross-examination or re-
buttal.269
In Foster v. Sakhai,270 the defendant asserted plaintiffs expert was not
qualified to testify about the way the brain surgery in question was performed
because he had not operated in several years and had never performed the par-
ticular technique at issue.27 1 Addressing the issue on appeal, the Supreme court
stated:
"[A] medical expert, otherwise qualified, is not barred from tes-
tifying merely because he or she is not engaged in practice as a
specialist in the field about which his or her testimony is of-
fered[.]" Dr. Smith, who was the plaintiffs expert, was also a
board certified neurological surgeon. We do not feel it was error
268 Id. at 732.
269 Id. (emphasis omitted).
270 559 S.E.2d 53 (W. Va. 2001).
271 Id. at 67.
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to allow him to give an opinion concerning the way in which
Dr. Sakhai performed the procedure in question.
272
In Kiser v Caudill,273 a neurosurgery case, the court agreed that the
plaintiff's expert neurologist was not qualified. In deposition and trial, the neu-
rologist conceded he was not an expert in neurosurgery, did not know the stan-
dard of care for the treatment at issue, and did not plan to testify about the stan-
dard of care required of a neurosurgeon. At trial, during cross-examination, the
expert acknowledged that he was not qualified or trained in the field of neuro-
surgery and was not familiar with the manner in which neurosurgical procedures
are performed.274 "Given [the expert's] own admissions about his limited knowl-
edge of neurosurgery," the Kiser court found that the circuit court did not err
"by limiting his testimony at trial to the field of neurology."
2 75
In Taylor v. Cabell Huntington Hospital,276 plaintiff challenged the cir-
cuit court's decision to allow defendant's nursing witness to testify as an expert.
Because expert qualifications are governed by Rule 702 of the West Virginia
Rules of Evidence, the supreme court stated:
[W]e believe that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the expert testimony of [defendant's nursing expert].
The record reveals that [defendant's nursing expert] has a mas-
ter's degree in nursing and a Ph.D. in medical anthropology.
She is board certified in emergency nursing and is a full profes-
sor and associate dean of the undergraduate nursing program at
Marshall University. Therefore, [defendant's nursing expert]
qualifies as an expert in standard nursing practices. [Defen-
dant's nursing expert] testified to the standard of care and
proper method in which to administer the type of intramuscular
injection involved in this case which is certainly specialized
knowledge. Finally, this testimony assisted the jury in determin-
ing whether Nurse Grim was negligent in the manner in which
she injected the appellant. We therefore conclude that the circuit
272 Id. at 68 (quoting Gilman v. Choi, 406 S.E.2d 200, 204 (W. Va. 1990)).
273 557 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 2001).
274 See id. at 249-50.
275 Id. at 250. The trial court was reversed in part, however, because after the circuit court
barred the use of a late disclosed expert, the case was continued for two years. The supreme court
found the initial order barring the use of the expert was proper, but on equitable principles should
have been changed when the case was continued. Id. at 251. ("There was ample opportunity for
additional discovery with respect to [the expert] after the trial was continued.").
276 538 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 2000).
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court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of
[defendant's nursing expert].277
Interestingly, the Taylor court noted that because the nurse was testify-
ing for the defendants, the MPLA did not apply to her testimony.278 West Vir-
ginia Code section 55-7B-7 applies "specifically to the manner in which plain-
tiffs in medical malpractice actions shall establish the applicable standard of
care and defendants' failure to meet that standard. 279 While there is no re-
quirement under the MPLA that the defendant have an expert, all parties' ex-
perts must be qualified under Rule 702.280
3. Standard of Care
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-3 requires the plaintiff to prove that
the health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care expected of a rea-
sonable prudent health care provider in the same profession or class acting in the
same or similar circumstances and that such failure was the proximate cause of
injury or death. 281 The factual basis for these fundamental elements will differ
in every case. Decisions under the MPLA related to the standard of care focus
mainly on jury instructions and challenges to the qualifications of liability ex-
perts (discussed above). Important in this discussion are the changes in the law
made in decisions involving instructions on medical judgment and multiple
methods of treatment.
With regard to the standard of care, in Taylor, a case involving allega-
tions of nursing negligence, the court upheld the following instruction:
277 Id. at 727.
278 Id. (noting that generally nurses are not competent to testify as to the standard of care of
physicians); see Stryczek v. Methodist Hosp., Inc., 694 N.E.2d 1186, 1189-90 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998); Taplin v. Lupin, 700 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Cebula v. Benoit, 652 S.W.2d
304, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Sigrist v. Clarke, 935 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Mor-
ris v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 597 N.E.2d t110, 1114-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). Since the
MPLA is definition-based, and depends on licensure, reference to the statutory licensing provi-
sions supports this distinction. Compare W. VA. CODE § 30-3-4(3) (2002) (practice of medicine
and surgery defined as "the diagnosis or treatment of, or operation or prescription for, any human
disease, pain, injury, deformity or other physical or mental condition"), with W. VA. CODE § 30-7-
1(b) (2002) (restricting nurses to nursing diagnoses and following physician instructions for
treatment or to the medical issue of causation) and Short v. Appalachian OH-9, 507 S.E.2d 246
(W. Va. 1998) (nurse not competent to testify about medical causation).
279 Taylor, 538 S.E.2d at 727.
280 See Mayhorn v. Logan Med. Found., 454 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1994).
281 Cf. Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967) (common law elements of medical mal-
practice action). Generally, there is no action for negligence without duty owed. Lockhart v.
Airco, 567 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 2002) (affirming summary judgment based on lack of duty owed).
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For the plaintiff to recover from [the nurse defendant] on her
claim, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: One,
that [defendant] is negligent; and, two, that her negligence was
a proximate cause of [plaintiffs] injury. Throughout these in-
structions, I will be using the term health care provider. That
term applies to the defendant, [nurse], who is considered to be a
health care provider. When you hear the term health care pro-
vider in these instructions, you should think of the defendant
and apply that term individually. I want to tell you about the
standard of care expected of the health care provider. The stan-
dard of care is important because in order for the plaintiff to
prove negligence, she must establish, one, the degree of care,
skill and learning required or expected of a reasonable, prudent
health care provider in the profession or class to which the
health care provider belongs acting in same or similar circum-
stances; and, two, that the health care provider deviated from
that standard; and, three, that the deviation was the proximate
282cause of the injury.
The statutory requirement that the jury be instructed that a breach of the
standard of care be proved by expert testimony was addressed in Michael v.
Sabado,283 where the court approved the following instruction:
The Court instructs the jury that in cases involving allegations
of medical malpractice, the law recognizes that the complexity
of the human body and medical science places questions as to
the standard of medical care and causation of the injury claimed
beyond the knowledge of the average lay person. Therefore, the
law requires that expert medical testimony be presented to es-
tablish the standard of care to be exercised by physicians. If
you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, that credible
evidence does not exist to establish malpractice, then your ver-
dict should be in favor of Dr. Sabado. 284
Conversely, the jury does not have to be instructed that common knowl-
edge claims do not require expert testimony. In Reynolds v. City Hospital,
Inc. ,285 the court rejected plaintiff s argument for an instruction under McGraw
282 538 S.E.2d at 728. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also provides jury instruc-
tions for medical malpractice actions at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/jury/medprof.htm.
283 453 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1994).
284 Id. at 434.
285 529 S.E.2d 341 (W. Va. 2000).
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v. St. Joseph's Hospital2 86 that expert testimony was not necessary to determine
whether defendant was negligent in allowing the patient to fall from a hospital
bed. Examining the instructions to the jury, the court found no error and agreed
McGraw was not intended as the basis for giving a jury instruction.2 87
Instructions on the standard of care do not have to specifically detail the
plaintiff's theories of liability. In Reynolds, the plaintiff submitted instructions
which stated that the jury could find negligence if it found the hospital failed to
do six specific activities which were the basis of plaintiffs case.288 Instead, the
trial court gave a more general instruction requiring the jury to determine
whether the defendant deviated from the standard of care, causing injury to the
plaintiff and resultant damages. The supreme court found "no error in the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury in language that Ms. Reynolds [plaintiff] erro-
neously contends stated her theory of the case. 289
It is reversible error, however, to instruct the jury that there is a pre-
sumption the defendant acted reasonably. In Matheny v. Fairmont General
Hospital,29° the supreme court reversed a defense verdict, in part, because the
circuit court instructed the jury it was to presume the defendant performed
its duty to the plaintiff. The Matheny court concluded that "[u]nder these
circumstances .... the instructions, when considered as a whole, likely mis-
led 'the jury into believing that a malpractice plaintiff bears a double burden
in proving [his or her] case.'
291
A significant decision related to standard of care instructions is Pleas-
ants v. Alliance Corp. .292 Pleasants eliminated the "mistake of judgment" in-
29329struction. This instruction, previously approved in Dye v. Corbin,294 states
that a mistake in judgment is not negligence unless the physician breaches the
standard of care, telling the jury it can and should evaluate the physician's clini-
cal judgment. In Pleasants, the circuit court instructed the jury:
286 488 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 1995).
287 Reynolds, 529 S.E.2d at 345.
288 Id. at 346.
289 Id. at 347; see also Matheny v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., No. 30256, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 233
(Dec. 6, 2002) (no error where one instruction suggested defendant had to cause infection, when
other instructions and evidence at trial addressed failure to diagnose and treat an existing infec-
tion).
290 No. 30256, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 233 (Dec. 6, 2002).
291 Id. at *26 (quoting Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 349 (Ariz. 1978)) (alteration in origi-
nal).
292 543 S.E.2d 320 (W. Va. 2000).
293 Id. at 331.
294 53 S.E. 147 (W. Va. 1906).
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A healthcare provider who exercises ordinary skill and care
while keeping within recognized and approved methods within
the standard of care is not negligent because of a reasonable and
honest mistake of judgment. A physician is liable for the result
of error or judgment where the error is so gross as to be incon-
sistent with the degree of skill which it's the duty of the physi-
cian to possess.
295
On appeal, the supreme court observed that many courts are veering
away from these instructions based on a potential for jury confusion. Recogniz-
ing the statutory elements in the MPLA, the court held that the "mistake of judg-
ment" instruction "wrongly injects subjectivity into an objective standard of
care; is argumentative and misleading; and should no longer be used to instruct
the jury concerning the relevant standard of care in a medical malpractice ac-
tion. 296 However, the court found no reversible error because the remaining
jury instructions properly set forth the elements necessary to prove a case under
the Medical Professional Liability Act.297 To the extent there was any doubt
after Pleasants, the supreme court formally reversed Dye v. Corbin in Yates v.
298University of West Virginia Board of Trustees. Then, in Hicks v. Ghaph-
ery,299 the supreme court reversed judgment for the defendant because the circuit
court gave a mistake of judgment instruction. The Hicks court made the hold-
ings in Yates and Pleasants retroactive and granted the plaintiff a new trial. 3°°
To the contrary, the "multiple methods of treatment" instruction was
upheld in Pleasants and Yates. In Pleasants, the instruction was affirmed be-
cause there was expert testimony about different tests and drugs ordered for
patients presenting symptoms similar to the decedent. 30 1 Accordingly,
[f]rom the evidence presented at trial, the jury was clearly in-
formed that the correct diagnosis was not made until after [the
decedent's] death. What the "multiple methods of treatment" in-
295 Pleasants, 543 S.E.2d at 329.
296 Id. at 331.
297 In a footnote, Justice Scott indicated he would uphold the giving of a mistake of judgment
instruction as long as it omitted subjective terms such as "honest mistake of judgment." Id. at 331
n.30. In a separate opinion, Justice Starcher stated physicians should not get the benefit of "mis-
take of judgment" instructions, comparing a physician to a driver who runs a stop sign and claims
an "honest" mistake. Id. at 332-33. (Starcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
298 549 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 2001).
299 571 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2002).
300 Id. at 323.
301 543 S.E.2d at 329. Pleasants bears reading for discussion of several other instruction is-
sues, including proximate cause, elimination of female jurors, and removal of jurors for false
responses to voir dire.
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struction did was to advise the jury that there is not just one rec-
ognized method of treating a patient who presents with the gastri-
tis symptoms that [the decedent] had. We find no error in the
giving of this instruction as the evidence before the jury sup-
ported such an instruction.3 °2
In Yates, the court was again asked to reject the "multiple methods of
treatment" instruction and refused. However, Yates suggests that a defendant
seeking the instruction has to put on evidence which "shows that the challenged
method of diagnosis or treatment enjoys such substantial support within the
medical community that it is, in fact, widely and generally recognized. 3 °3
Moreover,
[i]n order to make this showing, the defendant's expert must
opine that the challenged method of diagnosis or treatment has
substantial support and is generally recognized within the medical
community. This testimony should usually be supported by suffi-
cient extrinsic evidence such as medical textbooks, treatises,
journal articles, or other similar evidence.
304
Finding this evidence was lacking, the Yates court reversed the defense verdict
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Yates is significant for its discussion of the extrinsic evidence required
to support the multiple methods of treatment instruction. In this regard, the
court strayed from the general application of Rules 702 and 703 of the West
Virginia Rules of Evidence regarding experts to impose requirements for de-
fense experts which it has never imposed on plaintiffs.3 5 Rather than simply
requiring circuit courts to apply the case-by-case "gatekeeping" analysis of the
admissibility of expert testimony dictated by Gentry v. Mangum,306 the supreme
court suggested a burden apparently applicable only to defense experts.
3 7
Yates' burden on defendants to produce extrinsic evidence, like literature, stands
in contrast to the supreme court's treatment of plaintiff's experts. In Fortney v.
Al-Hajj, °8 the court allowed a surgeon to testify about the standard of care for
an emergency room physician because he had more than passing knowledge of
the condition at issue, making no provision for the production of any extrinsic
302 Id.
303 Yates, 549 S.E.2d at 690.
304 Id. at 689.
305 Id.
306 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).
307 Yates, 549 S.E.2d at 689.
308 425 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
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evidence. In Graham v. Wallace,309 confusing and contradictory testimony was
sufficient to allow plaintiff's case to go to the jury. The Yates court's discussion
of the need for extrinsic evidence, however, is dicta, and it remains to be seen
whether it is mandatory given the statement that "multiple method" testimony
"usually" must be supported by extrinsic evidence. 310
G. Informed Consent
The doctrine of informed consent was established in West Virginia in
Cross v. Trapp,3 1 which stated the general rule:
A physician has a duty to disclose information to his or her pa-
tient in order that the patient may give to the physician an in-
formed consent to a particular medical procedure such as sur-
gery. In the case of surgery, the physician ordinarily should dis-
close to the patient various considerations including (1) the pos-
sibility of the surgery, (2) the risks involved concerning the sur-
gery, (3) alternative methods of treatment, (4) the risks relating
to such alternative methods of treatment and (5) the results
likely to occur if the patient remains untreated.
In evaluating a physician's disclosure of information to his or
her patient, relative to whether that patient gave an informed
consent to a particular medical procedure such as surgery, this
Court hereby adopts the patient need standard, rather than phy-
sician disclosure standards based upon national or community
medical disclosure practice. Pursuant to the patient need stan-
dard, the need of the patient for information material to his or
her decision as to method of treatment, such as surgery, is the
standard by which the physician's duty to disclose is measured.
Under the patient need standard, the disclosure issue is ap-
proached from the reasonableness of the physician's disclosure
or nondisclosure in terms of what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's informational needs. Therefore,
whether a particular medical risk should be disclosed by the
physician to the patient under the patient need standard ordinar-
ily depends upon the existence and materiality of such risk with
respect to the patient's decision relating to medical treatment.31 2
309 538 S.E.2d 730 (W. Va. 2000).
310 549 S.E.2d at 689.
31 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
312 Id. at 468; see also Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va.
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In Hicks v. Ghaphery,31 3 the supreme court declined to extend the doc-
trine of informed consent to procedures not recommended by the physician.
314
The patient argued that the defendant physician should have recommended a
certain procedure, and should have obtained informed consent. The physician
testified that he did not recommend the procedure because he did not think it
was indicated. The court concluded that the issue of whether the physician was
negligent or not by failing to recommend the procedure was correctly submitted
to the jury. The court held an informed consent instruction was not appropriate,
stating that it would be inappropriate to impose a duty on a physician to disclose
and recommend a procedure that the physician did not think was appropriate.
315
Thus, the Hicks court found
that the jury must assess a physician's failure to recommend a
procedure in terms of whether he or she violated the applicable
standard of care. In other words, "[i]f the procedure is one
which should have been proposed, then the failure to recom-
mend it would be negligence under ordinary medical negligence
principles and there is no need to consider an additional duty of
disclosure. 316
An important area of informed consent in West Virginia involves the
"mature minor." In Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center,317 the court
recognized that minors have the right to make informed choices about health
care decisions, depending on their maturity.
318
H. Causation
Causation presents a complex issue in the MPLA. West Virginia Code
section 55-7B-3(b) requires the plaintiff to prove that the failure to meet the
standard of care "was a proximate cause of the injury or death." However, the
term "proximate cause" is not defined in the MPLA.
1992); Catlett v. MacQueen, 375 S.E.2d 184 (W. Va. 1988); Adams v. El-Bash, 338 S.E.2d 381
(W. Va. 1985).
313 571 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2002).
314 Id. at 325.
315 Id.
316 Id. (quoting Vandi v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 9 Cal. Reptr. 2d 463, 467 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992)).
317 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992).
318 Id. at 836-37. Belcher contains a detailed discussion of the factors a health care provider
must consider in determining maturity and extends a "good faith" defense to the decision making
process. Id. at 838.
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Analyzing medical malpractice causation requires consideration of sev-
eral factors. The primary factor is the causal relationship between the breach of
the standard of care and damages, which must be established by expert testi-
mony.319 Another threshold issue is reliability of the testimony.3 20 In State ex rel
Wiseman v. Henning,321 the circuit court precluded the plaintiff's medical expert
from testifying because it found his testimony unreliable under Wilt v. Bu-
322 323racker322 and Gentry v. Mangum. The plaintiff sustained a rib injury in a ve-
hicular accident with the defendants' truck. A biopsy revealed abnormal cells at
the site, and the plaintiff later developed cancer of the bone marrow. His expert
was prepared to correlate the cancer to the auto wreck, testifying the plaintiff
had trauma-induced myeloma.
Performing its gatekeeper functions, the circuit court excluded the ex-
pert's testimony, concluding that it showed only a possible or potential causal
link. The circuit court also found that the expert could "show no basis in estab-
lished scientific knowledge because it has not been subjected to testing, peer
review or publication, an established error rate, controlling standards, or a gen-
eral acceptance in the scientific community[.]
' 324
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court. First, the
Wiseman court found the issuance of a writ of prohibition appropriate because
the plaintiff did not have a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" and there was a
high likelihood of reversal on appeal.325 The court also found a sufficient show-
ing under Wilt and Gentry to allow the testimony of the causation expert, stat-
ing:
Dr. Hussein's proffered opinion that multiple myeloma can re-
sult from a trauma was based upon: his extensive treatment of
Mr. Wiseman; his treatment of five other patients at the Cleve-
land Clinic who had trauma-induced myelomas; his study of the
319 State ex rel Weirton Med. Ctr. v. Mazzone, No. 30360, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 97 (June 19,
2002); Daniel v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 544 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001); Short v. Appa-
lachian OH-9, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 124 (W.Va. 1998); Bellomy, 888 F. Supp. at 760; State v.
McKenzie, 475 S.E.2d 521 (W. Va. 1996).
320 For some general references to the Daubert standards, see Katerina M. Eftimoff, The Dec-
ade After Daubert Proves Tough on Expert Witnesses, 27 LmG. NEWS 1 (July 2002) (publication
of the American Bar Association Litigation Section); Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary
Standards for Medical Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA 1382-1387 (2002) (Federal
Judicial Center Report); Ron Nichwolodoff, Expert Psychological Opinion Evidence in the
Courts, 6 HEALTH L.J. 279 (1998) (examining Daubert from the context of Canadian law).
321 569 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 2002).
322 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993).
323 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995).
324 569 S.E.2d at 207.
325 Id. at 208.
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physiological process of tissue injury causing chronic inflam-
mation and overstimulation of cells, which triggers the growth
of cancerous cells; his interaction with other specialists who
also believe that trauma can trigger the occurrence of myeloma;
and the handful of published studies by other cancer centers that
have identified local tissue injury, including a bone fracture, as
a risk factor for causing multiple myeloma.326
The supreme court limited the use of nurse testimony to provide the
necessary expert causation testimony in Short v. Appalachian OH-9. 327 The su-
preme court upheld summary judgment, finding that the circuit court acted
within its discretion in determining that apellant's disclosed nursing expert was
not qualified to offer causation testimony.
328
The issue of proximate cause was further discussed by the court in Fos-
ter v. Sakhai,329 where the following instruction was given by the circuit court:
It follows then, to recover from Dr. Sakhai, Mrs. Foster must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Sakhai's
negligence proximately caused Mr. Foster's injury. If, from a
preponderance of the evidence, you find that Dr. Sakhai's
treatment of Mr. Foster was not the proximate cause of the in-
jury, then you must find for Dr. Sakhai ....
If you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Fos-
ter's injury resulted from a proximate cause or causes over
326 Id. at 209-10. Justice Maynard dissented, finding the circuit court did not commit a clear
legal error justifying the issuance of a writ. He also reviewed the Wilt/Gentry factors, concluding
the trial court correctly excluded the testimony. He challenged whether the testimony about six
similar cases was a representative scientific sample, and whether the expert's opinions had been
subject to peer review or whether the error rate was known. Moreover, he pointed out that the
theory was not generally accepted. Id. at 210-11 (Maynard, J., dissenting); see also State v. Leep,
569 S.E.2d 133 (W. Va. 2002) (analyzing the admissibility of chlamydia testing; extensive discus-
sion of Frye/Wilt/Daubert; emphasizing the role of cross-examination in ferreting out weakness in
expert testimony). Leep also held the judge's remarks to the jury that the testing had already been
approved by the court were improper: "As a general rule, West Virginia courts are not permitted
to comment on the weight of the evidence[.]" Id. at 146 (quoting in part Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Spada-
fore, 220 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1975)). "A trial judge should not comment on the weight of evi-
dence bearing upon any factual matters to be submitted to the jury for decision. A violation of this
general rule may constitute reversible error." Id. at 146 (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Crockett, 265
S.E.2d 268 (W. Va. 1979)). In light of the dangers inherent in expert scientific testimony, "it is..
. important when scientific evidence is involved in such a proceeding, that the trial judge be espe-
cially careful to display an aura of neutrality." Id. at 147. Concerned that the judge's comments
failed in this regard, the jury verdict was overturned. Id.
327 507 S.E.2d 124 (W. Va. 1998).
328 Id. at 126.
329 559 S.E.2d 53 (W. Va. 2001).
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which Dr. Sakhai had no control or for which he is not respon-
sible, your verdict may be for Dr. Sakhai.330
After a verdict for the plaintiff, the circuit court granted a new trial for
the defendant, finding in part that the jury instruction was confusing because of
the use of the words "may" and "must., 331 The supreme court reversed and re-
instated the verdict, finding "it hard to imagine that any juror had such a firm
and complete grasp upon the facts of the case, every word of the jury charge,
and the Queen's English that he or she, upon hearing the word 'may' saw a
golden opportunity to treat Dr. Sakhai unfairly. 332
Another significant causation issue arises when there is successive neg-
ligence of health care providers. A negligent health care provider is liable for
the aggravation of injuries resulting from subsequent negligent medical treat-
ment, if foreseeable, where that subsequent medical treatment is undertaken to
mitigate harm caused by the first provider's negligence. 333 "The relationship
between the harm inflicted by the first physician and the treatment initiated by
the second is crucial to holding the first physician liable for subsequent malprac-
tice. 33 4
In Rine v. Irisari,335 the court ruled that the jury had not been fully in-
structed on this issue and determined that the following instruction should have
been given to the jury:
330 Id. at 64 (emphasis added by supreme court).
331 Id. at 59, 64.
332 Id. at 64. The court restated in Foster its general view of appellate review of jury instruc-
tions, stating:
The formulation of jury instructions is within the broad discretion of a circuit
court, and a circuit court's giving of an instruction is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. A verdict should not be disturbed based on the formula-
tion of the language of the jury instructions so long as the instructions given as
a whole are accurate and fair to both parties.
Id. (quoting Syl. Pt. 6, Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., 459 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995)).
The Foster court's determination that juries are not confused by the use of words "may" and
"must" contrasts in a sense with its examination of language in Butcher v. Miller, 569 S.E.2d 89
(W. Va. 2002), where it reversed the defendant's license suspension for drunk driving because of
his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer. In Butcher, the defendant refused a breathalyzer test after
being informed refusal "may" result in the loss of his license. Id. at 90. Strictly applying West
Virginia Code section 17C-5-7(a), which states the officer must inform the arrestee that refusal to
take a breathalyzer "will" result in a license suspension, the court found the use of "may" did not
substantially comply with the statute's terms. Butcher, 569 S.E.2d at 93; see also Hanson v.
Miller, 567 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 2002) (single test breathalyzer test admissible).
333 Syl. Pt. 1, Rine v. Irisari, 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992); Syl. Pt. 3, Thornton v. Charleston
Area Med. Ctr., 213 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1975).
334 Rine, 420 S.E.2d at 544 (quoting Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir.
1991)).
335 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992).
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You are instructed that if you find [the defendant physician]
negligent, then it is not a defense for him nor can he avoid li-
ability for aggravation of the injuries caused by medical per-
sonnel who later negligently treated [the patient] for the injuries
he received as a result of the original negligence of Defendant.
Any reduction in the amount of damages as a result of other
persons' negligence, if any, will be done by me, if the law so
provides, after the verdict. It is therefore important that you as-
sess the total amount of damages, if any, according to these in-
structions.33 6
The court clearly applies this aggravation of injuries rule to a physician
whose original negligence causes the intervention of a second physician who is
negligent. Significant is the fact the second physician in Rine settled with the
plaintiffs, and the first physician had to absorb his negligence at trial.
Another significant causation issue in MPLA actions is the "loss of
chance" or "value of chance" doctrine.337 This doctrine attempts to hold a
healthcare provider responsible for depriving a patient of a chance of recov-
ery or survival due to a breach of the standard of care, thereby decreasing the
patient's chance of survival or causing the patient's death. The doctrine of-
fers a theory of recovery based on the loss of the opportunity to recover from
an illness.338
In Thornton v. Charleston Area Medical Center,339 the court recog-
nized that the leading decision concerning the "value of chance" theory as
applied in medical malpractice cases is Hicks v. United States.34 ° In Hicks, a
physician who diagnosed gastroenteritis was found negligent for his failure
to properly diagnose and treat a patient who died from an intestinal obstruc-
tion. The Hicks court applied the "value of chance" theory "because the
medical experts who testified at the trial stated that if the patient had been
properly diagnosed she would have recovered from the illness." 341 The court
then concluded that the physician's negligence "nullified whatever chance of
recovery she might have had and was the proximate cause of the death. 342
336 Id. at 546 n.9.
337 In West Virginia, the "loss of chance" doctrine is also referred to as the "value of chance"
doctrine. See Thornton v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 305 S.E.2d 316, 323 (W. Va. 1983).
338 Id.
339 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1983).
W10 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
341 Thornton, 305 S.E.2d at 323 (citing Hicks, 368 F.2d at 633).
342 Hicks, 368 F.2d at 633.
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The Thornton court stated that the general purpose of the value of
chance doctrine is to further elaborate the proximate cause theory in medical
malpractice cases. The court followed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
reasoning in Hamil v. Baseline,343 which relied on the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 323(a) in addressing the issue.344 The Hamil court noted that
the Restatement section allows the issue of medical malpractice to go to the
jury on a lower than normal threshold of proof.345 In Thornton, the plaintiff
suffered a fracture of his right leg in a motorcycle accident. He was hospi-
talized at CAMC and subsequently underwent medical treatment for four
years. Ultimately, the plaintiff had to have his right leg amputated below the
knee. The plaintiff's theory was that the original leg injury had been im-
properly treated, which aggravated the injury and thus necessitated the am-
putation.346 The defendant asserted that the original injury was so severe that
amputation would have resulted regardless of his treatment.
The "value of chance" theory was applied to the plaintiff's claim that
the physician's negligence took away any chance of the right leg healing
properly, and thus proximately caused the amputation. The court recognized
that the issue was one of causation and addressed whether the physician's
action or inaction increased risk of the amputation, and was a substantial
factor in the amputation of the plaintiff' s leg.347
I. Summary Jury Trial
House Bill 601 adds a new provision allowing the circuit court to order
a "summary jury trial ...if all parties represent a case is ready for trial and
jointly move the court for a summary jury trial ....,,348 Summary jury trials, as
described in section 55-7B-6c, are designed in a streamlined format which al-
lows the presentation of evidence by counsel for the parties without calling wit-
nesses.
343 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978).
344 Section 323 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertak-
ing if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
345 Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1287-88.
346 Thornton, 305 S.E.2d at 323.
347 Id.; see also Syl. Pt. 1, Hudnall v. Mate Creek Trucking, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1997);
Shia v. Chvasta, 377 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1988); Syl. Pt. 6, Catlett v. MacQueen, 375 S.E.2d 184
(W. Va. 1988).
348 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6b(d) (2001).
[Vol. 105
56
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss2/5
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
In other jurisdictions, the purpose of the summary jury trial is to attempt
settlement of disputes.349
A summary jury trial is a non-binding proceeding that encour-
ages settlement. The trial usually lasts less than a full day ....
Generally, six jurors are chosen after a brief voir dire conducted
by the court. Following short opening statements, the attorneys
present the evidence to the jury. Live witnesses do not testify,
and evidentiary and procedural rules are few and flexible. After
the attorneys' presentations, the jury is given an abbreviated
charge and is requested to return a unanimous verdict. If the ju-
rors cannot reach a consensus, they are asked to return a special
verdict, listing individual perceptions of liability and damages.
The special verdict affords counsel insights as to lay percep-
tions of the case and aids arriving at an equitable basis for set-
tlement.35°
Summary jury trials are held before a six person jury, generally last no
more than one day,351 and consist of the presentation of evidence by counsel for
the parties, based on "pleadings, depositions, or other discovery requests and
responses, exhibits and statements of potential witnesses. ''35 2  Unless the court
orders otherwise, each party has one hour to present its case, and where there are
multiple parties, the court shall make reasonable adjustment of the time al-
lowed.353
Section 55-7B-6c(d) expressly provides:
349 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 902 n. I (6th Cir. 1988).
350 Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 939 F.2d 1472 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citing Thomas D. Lam-
bros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, A Report to
the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee of the Operation of the Jury System, 103
F.R.D. 461, 483-84 (1984)); see also Russell v. PPG Industries, Inc., 953 F.2d 326, 334 (7th Cir.
1992). The idea for summary jury trials was advanced in 1980. Lambros, supra note 350, at 463;
see John F. Wagner, Jr., Validity and Effect of Local District Court Rules Providing for Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures as Pretrial Settlement Mechanisms, 86 A.L.R. FED 211
(1992); Gitchell & Plattner, supra note 203, at 457. Some courts hold Rule 16 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure does not provide for mandatory summary jury trials. See In re NLO, Inc.,
5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993); Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). But see
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("[M]andatory summary jury
trials would seem to be within the inherent power of the court."); Lambros, supra note 350, at 469
(summary jury trial within court's inherent power). Courts have ruled that since summary trials
are a means to settlement, they are confidential, and the press and non-parties had no right to
attend. See In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Voinovich, 92 F.3d 383
(6th Cir. 1996); cf B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 1995).
351 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6c(a) (Supp. 2002).
352 Id. § 55-7B-6c(d).
353 Id. § 55-7B-6c(e).
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No potential testimony of a witness may be referred to unless
the reference is based on: (i) The product of discovery proce-
dures; (ii) a written sworn statement of the witness; or (iii) an
affidavit of counsel stating that although an affidavit of the wit-
ness is not available and cannot be obtained by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, the witness would be called at trial and
counsel has been told the substance of the testimony of the wit-
ness. The substance of the witness' testimony must also be in-
cluded in the affidavit of counsel. 4
Counsel may object to presentations that violate subsection (d) or which go be-
yond the limits of propriety in statements about the evidence or otherwise.
355
As to instructions and jury deliberations, section 55-7B-6c(g) states:
Following the presentations by counsel, the court shall give an
abbreviated set of instructions to the jury on the applicable law.
The jury will be encouraged to return a verdict that represents a
unanimous verdict of the jurors. If after a reasonable time a
unanimous verdict is not possible, the jury shall be directed to
return a special verdict consisting of an anonymous statement of
each juror's finding on liability and damages. Following the
verdict, the court may invite, but may not require, the jurors to
informally discuss the case with the attorneys and the parties.
356
Summary jury proceedings are not recorded unless a party makes the ar-
rangements at its own expense. Statements in briefs or summaries, statements
of counsel and the verdict are not admissible in any evidentiary proceeding.357
Within thirty days of the verdict, the parties must file a notice stating
whether they accept or reject the summary trial verdict. 8 If all parties accept,
then the verdict is to be reduced to judgment by the court. If one party rejects,
the case then proceeds in the normal fashion to trial. However, a rejecting party
must later win to avoid the imposition of sanctions.359 Section 55-7B-6(c) pro-
354 Id. § 55-7B-6c(d).
355 Id. § 55-7B-6c(f).
356 Id.
357 Id. § 55-7B-6(c), -6(h).
358 Id. § 55-7B-6(c).
359 Id. The statute states:
If a verdict is rendered upon the subsequent trial of the case which is not more
than twenty percent more favorable to a party who rejected the summary jury
trial verdict and indicated a desire to proceed to trial, the rejecting party is
liable for the costs incurred by the other party or parties subsequent to the
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vides that the plaintiff who loses a summary trial must win at the "real" trial or
obtain a verdict at least 20% larger than the summary trial verdict, or be liable
for costs and attorneys' fees for the defense. Conversely, the defendant who
proceeds against an adverse verdict must either win or lessen his or her liability
by at least 20%. 36
The liability for attorneys' fees is significant to both sides, as it puts
"teeth" into the decision to proceed in the face of an adverse summary trial ver-
dict. Other sanctions provisions in the MPLA do not include, and in fact ex-
clude, attorneys' fees as a sanction. 36' This provision probably means that
summary trial will be used sparingly, and most likely as a tool for settlement.
Indeed, to the extent the summary trial provision is designed to give the parties
an opportunity to "test" a case in an effort to further settlement, the attorneys'
fees provisions probably discourage, rather than encourage, its use.
J. Assorted Trial Issues
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6b(c) requires the circuit court to en-
ter a scheduling order which sets a trial date within 24 months from the date the
defendant made an appearance, or in cases of multiple defendants, within 24
months of the last defendant's appearance. The trial date "shall be adhered to
unless, for good cause shown, the court enters an order continuing the trial
date. 362
The supreme court has addressed various trial evidence issues. In Hicks
v. Ghaphery, the court held that the Dead Man's Statute does not apply to
MPLA actions. 363 Thus, "[West Virginia] Code [section] 57-3-1 (1937) does
summary jury trial, in a similar manner as is provided in rule 68(c) of the rules
of civil procedure when a claimant rejects an offer of judgment, and is liable
for attorneys' fees incurred after the summary jury trial.
Id.
360 This provision suggests a couple of interesting issues which may ultimately be resolved by
the courts. The "twenty percent more favorable" language is easy when you simply consider
money damages. If a single plaintiff increased or a single defendant reduced a verdict 20%, then
the statute would seem to be satisfied. More complex, perhaps, are multi defendant cases where
"twenty percent more favorable" could be interpreted to apply to a reduction in a defendant's
relative share of the verdict. For example, a defendant could lose the summary trial, but decrease
its liability by 20%, and not be liable for costs and fees. Another interesting issue is where, in a
multiple defendant case, a defendant is successful in reducing its liability below 25%, making its
liability several only, and perhaps reducing its ultimate share more than 20%.
361 Existing provisions of the MPLA allow the imposition of sanctions, but exclude attorneys'
fees. See W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(b) (Supp. 2002).
362 Id. § 55-7B-6b(c). For a case discussing the circuit court's power as it relates to scheduling
and bifurcation, see State ex rel. Shelton v. Burnside, No. 30671, 2002 WL 31465717 (W. Va.
Nov. 4, 2002).
363 571 S.E.2d at 329; see also Martin v. Smith, 438 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1993).
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not bar any party in a wrongful death, medical malpractice action from testify-
ing about conversations with the deceased patient."364 It was appropriate, there-
fore, to allow the physician to testify about treatment recommendations he made
to the decedent. 36  Moreover, statements made for purposes of medical treat-
ment are admissible under Rule 803(4) of the West Virginia Rules of Evi-
dence.36
In Hicks, the court also held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
court to preclude cross-examination of a physician about prior malpractice ac-
tions. 367 The plaintiff argued that the defendant physician's attempt to portray
himself as one of the best doctors in the area and country "opened the door" for
such cross examination. Since the circuit court gave a strong instruction to the
jury to disregard the "best doctor" testimony, the supreme court found no abuse
of discretion.368
Improper statements by counsel which violate an in limine motion may
or may not result in reversal.369
K. Jury
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-6d provides for twelve jurors instead
of six in MPLA cases, and for a verdict based on a majority of nine.370 "The
364 Id. at 330.
365 Id. The Hicks court discussed at length its reasoning, concluding:
In light of the distinctive provisions of the MPLA and considering the con-
tinually evolving nature of the common law, we believe it is necessary to
carve out a narrow exception to the Dead Man's Statute which limits its appli-
cability in medical malpractice cases. Specifically, we believe that no party
should be prohibited from offering evidence in a medical malpractice case be-
cause of the Dead Man's Statute. Obviously, the focus of a medical malprac-
tice case is the care and treatment of the patient. In the instance where the pa-
tient is deceased, it would be patently unfair to exclude evidence of a patient's
complaints regarding their symptoms and ailments and their decisions as to
what type of treatment they wished to undergo. In some cases, a patient's sub-
jective description of their ailments may be the sole basis for a physician's di-
agnosis and treatment.
Id. at 329.
366 See State v. Pettry, 549 S.E.2d 323, 336 (W. Va. 2001) (Starcher, J., concurring).
367 571 S.E.2d at 326 (noting that curative instruction was sufficient even though doctor had
portrayed himself "as one of the best doctors in the area, as well as in America").
368 Id.
369 Compare Honaker v. Mahon, 552 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 2001), with Foster v. Sakhai, 559
S.E.2d 53 (W.Va. 2001), and Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp. Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986);
see also Matheny v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., No. 30256, 2002 WL 31746852 (W. Va. Dec. 6, 2002)
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judge shall instruct the jury that they should endeavor to reach a unanimous
verdict but, if they cannot reach a unanimous verdict, they may return a majority
verdict of nine of the twelve members of the jury."'37' The court must accept a
nine-member verdict, but all concurring jurors must sign the verdict form. The
verdict must be announced in open court by either the judge or the foreman, and
the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or the court. If polling shows
nine members do not concur, they are to retire for further deliberations.
Section 56-6-12 provides for voir dire of jurors to determine whether
they can fairly judge a particular case. If "it shall appear to the court that such
person is not a qualified juror or does not stand indifferent in the cause, another
shall be called and placed in his stead for the trial of that cause. 373 In O'Dell v.
Miller,374 the court stated:
The object of jury selection is to secure jurors who are not only
free from improper prejudice and bias, but who are also free
from the suspicion of improper prejudice or bias. Voir dire fer-
rets out biases and prejudices to create a jury panel, before the
exercise of peremptory strikes, free of the taint of reasonably
suspected prejudice or bias. Trial courts have an obligation to
strike biased or prejudiced jurors for cause.375
Doubts should be resolved in favor of the party seeking to strike the juror for
cause. Even where a juror claims impartiality, other statements must be consid-
ered on the issue as well as hospital employment, medical background and rela-
tionship with defendant.37 6 In MPLA actions, an important factor to be consid-
ered is the juror's relationship with the defendant health care provider. Where
there is a physician-patient relationship between a juror and defendant, even in
the past, or an attorney-client relationship between the juror and counsel for one
of the parties, the court should strike the juror.377
370 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6d (2002); see also W. VA. CODE § 56-6-11 (2002) (reflecting the
change to the nine-twelve jury system).
371 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-6(d).
372 Id.
373 Id. § 56-6-12 (2002).
374 565 S.E.2d 407 (W. Va. 2002).
375 Id. at 410 (juror who was a former patient of the defendant physician, and realized action
could affect his practice, and was a current client of the defendant's law firm should have been
struck for cause).
376 See Rine v. Irisari, 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992); see also W. Va. Dept. of Highways v.
Fisher, 289 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1982).
377 See O'Dell, 565 S.E.2d at 407 ("Any doubt the court might have regarding the impartiality
of a juror must be resolved in favor of the party seeking to strike the potential juror.") (citation
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L Comparative Fault, Joint & Several Liability, Third Party and Settle-
ment Issues
Generally, West Virginia follows a modified system of comparative
causation. A plaintiff is barred from recovery if his negligence equals or ex-
ceeds 50% of the combined negligence or fault of all parties to an accident.378
The jury assesses the fault of all the parties. 379 Defendants have a right to con-
tribution from other negligent parties. Issues of comparative fault and contribu-
tory negligence are generally for resolution by the jury. In Raines v. Lindsey,
38
0
the court stated that in
a comparative negligence or causation action the issue of appor-
tionment of negligence or causation is one for the jury or other
trier of the facts, and only in the clearest of cases where the
facts are undisputed and reasonable minds can draw but one in-
ference from them should such issue be determined as a matter
of law. The fact finder's apportionment of negligence or causa-
tion may be set aside only if it is grossly disproportionate.
38 1
The MPLA modifies the comparative causation scheme. West Virginia
Code section 55-7B-9(a) requires the jury, in trials involving multiple defen-
dants, to allocate percentages of fault among parties to the injury. Then, section
55-7B-9(b) states that
in every medical professional liability action, the court shall
make findings as to the total dollar amount awarded as damages
to each plaintiff. The court shall enter judgment of joint and
several liability against every defendant which bears 25% or
more of the negligence attributable to all defendants. The court
omitted); see also Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 633 (W. Va. 2002); Phares v. Brooks,
566 S.E.2d 233 (W. Va. 2002); State v. Johnson, 565 S.E.2d 415 (W. Va. 2002); Davis v. Wang,
400 S.E.2d 230, 234 (W. Va. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Pleasants v. Alliance Corp.,
543 S.E.2d 320 (W. Va. 2000); State v. West, 200 S.E.2d 859, 866 (W. Va. 1973). When an
attorney learns of information that would disqualify a juror, the issue must be brought to the atten-
tion of the trial court as soon as possible, Syl. Pt. 5, McGlone v. Superior Trucking, Inc., 363
S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1987), unless the information is such that when discovered, nothing could
have been done. State v. Varner, No. 30658, 2002 WL 31519686 (W. Va. Nov. 8, 2002) (noting
that motion for new trial was not untimely because juror's false answers to voir dire questions
were not discovered until trial was over).
378 Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
379 Bowman v. Barnes, 282 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1981).
380 423 S.E.2d 376 (W. Va. 1992).
381 Id. at 379; see also Biddle v. Haddix, 179 S.E.2d 215 (W. Va. 1971); Wilson v. Edwards, 77
S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1953); Miller v. Blue Ridge Transp. Co., 15 S.E.2d 400 (W. Va. 1941).
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shall enter judgment of several, but not joint, liability against
and among all defendants which bear less than 25% of the neg-
ligence attributable to all defendants.382
The jury's verdict setting the percentages of negligence among defendants is
binding as to their rights of contribution.383 The 25% rule applies only to the
defendants in an MPLA action and does not apply to non-party tortfeasors
unless there is evidence of contributory negligence by the plaintiff.384  West
Virginia Code section 55-7B-9 is consistent with general West Virginia law
which allows a plaintiff to sue any or all of those responsible for his injuries and
collect his damages from whomever is able to pay, regardless of the percentage
of fault.
385
West Virginia places a heavy burden on defendants seeking to establish
contributory negligence by the plaintiff, as demonstrated by Rowe v. Sisters of
the Pallotine Missionary Society.386 Rowe involved failure to diagnose a com-
partment syndrome. The plaintiff settled with the doctor and went to trial
against the hospital, arguing the nurses failed to advocate for the patient in light
of his symptoms. Rowe has several significant holdings. First, the supreme
court concluded that "a health care provider is not entitled to a comparative neg-
ligence instruction requiring a jury to consider the plaintiffs negligent conduct
that triggered the plaintiff s need for medical treatment."387 The court reasoned:
382 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9(c) (2002) states:
Each defendant against whom a judgment of joint and several liability is en-
tered in a medical professional liability action pursuant to subsection (b) of
this section is liable to each plaintiff for all or any part of the total dollar
amount regardless of the percentage of negligence attributable to him. The
right of contribution exists in favor of each defendant who is paid to a plaintiff
more than a percentage of the total dollar amount awarded attributable to him
relative to the percentage of negligence attributable to him. The total amount
of recovery for contribution is limited to the amount paid by the defendant to a
plaintiff in excess of the percentage of the total dollar amount awarded attrib-
utable to him. No right of contribution exists against any defendant who en-
tered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff prior to the jury's report of
its findings to the court or the court's findings as to the total dollar amount
awarded as damages.
383 Id. § 55-7B-9(d).
394 Rowe v. Sisters of the Pallotine Missionary Soc., 560 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 2001). In Rowe,
the court stated: "Consequently, without some proof of negligence by the plaintiff, there is no
requirement that the jury be instructed to ascertain or apportion fault between the defendant and a
non-party tortfeasor." Id. at 499.
385 Teter v. Old Colony Co., 441 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 1994); Kodym v. Frazier, 412 S.E.2d 219
(W. Va. 1991).
386 560 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 2001).
387 Id. at 497.
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Plaintiffs who negligently injure themselves are entitled to sub-
sequent, non-negligent medical treatment. If a health care pro-
vider renders negligent medical treatment, regardless of the
event that triggered the need for medical treatment, plaintiffs
are entitled to an undiminished recovery in a tort action for any
damages proximately caused by that negligent medical treat-
ment.388
As to plaintiffs comparative fault, the Rowe court noted that "[iln the
context of medical malpractice actions, courts usually place extreme limits upon
a health care provider's use of the defense of comparative negligence., 389 Thus,
[c]ontributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is an af-
firmative defense. There is a presumption of ordinary care in
favor of the plaintiff, and where the defendant relies upon con-
tributory negligence, the burden of proof rests upon the defen-
dant to show such negligence unless it is disclosed by the plain-
tiff s evidence or may be fairly inferred by all of the evidence
and circumstances surrounding the case.39 °
Accordingly, in West Virginia, "the health care provider must prove, with re-
spect to plaintiffs conduct after medical treatment is initiated, that: (1) the
plaintiff owed himself a duty of care; (2) the plaintiff breached that duty; and (3)
the breach was a proximate cause of the damages the plaintiff sustained.,
391
Significantly, the Rowe court also ruled that the jury did not have to be
instructed to consider the negligence of the settling physician.
[T]he comparative negligence doctrine applies only when a
plaintiff has been contributorily negligent - the negligence of
the plaintiff in causing his or her injury is ascertained in relation
to all other tortfeasors.
Consequently, without some proof of negligence by the
plaintiff, there is no requirement that the jury be instructed to
ascertain or apportion fault between the defendant and a non-
party tortfeasor.392
389 Id.
390 Id. at 498.
391 Id.; see also Judy v. Grant County Health Dept., 577 S.E.2d. 340 (W. Va. 2001).
392 Rowe, 560 S.E.2d at 499 (footnotes omitted).
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The Rowe court also held that the MPLA's 25% rule only applies to par-
ties in the case at the time of verdict, stating that the physician "had settled and
was dismissed from the action, and none of the other alleged tortfeasors was
brought into the litigation, by either the appellee or the appellant. [The physi-
cian] and the other alleged tortfeasors were not 'defendants' in the trial. 393
Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, the plaintiff chooses whom to settle
with and proceeds to trial against others without limitation, thereby increasing
the pressure on non-settling parties to settle.
In several opinions, the supreme court has severely limited the "empty
chair" defense, i.e., the ability of defendants to argue the negligence of an absent
party.394 The "empty chair" prohibition, however, does not proscribe arguments
based on causation. In Matheny v. Fairmont General Hospital,395 the court held
that defense counsel's statements in closing argument asserting that the patient's
injuries resulted from failure to promptly seek treatment did not improperly
suggest contributory negligence.
In order to seek contribution and indemnity from non-parties, it appears
defendants must bring them into the action by third party claim. In Howell v.
Luckey,396 the court held a defendant cannot seek contribution in a separate ac-
tion after losing a jury verdict. Instead, the alleged negligent non-party must be
joined by a third party action.397 Likewise, in Wilkinson v. Duff,398 the court
affirmed summary judgment for a pharmaceutical manufacturer on a physician's
third party claim.
399
Woodrum v. Johnson400 is an important opinion concerning settlement
with an agent and its effect on the principal. The court held:
A plaintiffs voluntary settlement with and release of a defen-
dant who is primarily liable for the plaintiffs injury does not
operate to release parties defendant whose liability is vicarious
or derivative based solely upon their relationship with the set-
tling defendant.
401
393 Id. at 500.
394 See Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 558 S.E.2d 663 (W. Va. 2001).
395 No. 30256, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 233 (Dec. 6, 2002).
396 518 S.E.2d 873 (1999).
397 Id. at 877.
398 No. 30399, 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 236 (Dec. 5, 2002).
399 For a discussion of Wilkinson, see supra notes 145 to 152 and accompanying text.
400 559 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 2001).
401 Id. at 909 Syl. Pt. 3.
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In Woodrum, the plaintiff sued the defendant surgeon (and the hospital
under ostensible agency theory) for negligently failing to diagnose and treat an
infection. 40 2 After discovery, the plaintiff reached a confidential settlement with
the physician for less than his policy limits, specifically reserving the plaintiffs
right to proceed against the hospital. The plaintiff refused to disclose the
amount of the settlement, except to admit it was below the physician's policy
limits. The plaintiff also refused to dismiss the hospital. 403
The hospital moved for summary judgment, asserting that the release of
the agent releases the principal where the allegations are solely based on osten-
sible agency.4°4 Despite law from other jurisdictions supporting the hospital, the
circuit court denied the motion, and certified the following question, which the
supreme court answered in the negative:
Does the settlement with and release of a physician, who is an
alleged ostensible agent of a hospital, necessarily release the
hospital from further liability for the alleged malpractice of the
physician where: (1) the physician is not an employee of the
hospital; (2) the only negligence alleged is that of the physician;
and (3) there is no allegation of negligence against the hospi-
tal?40 5
Woodrum is a fairly confusing opinion in which the supreme court -
based on West Virginia Code section 55-7-12 and dicta from a 1953 West Vir-
ginia case - concluded that principals are simply joint tortfeasors with their
agents.4°6 Noting that a plaintiff can sue a principal without suing the agent and
dismiss a sued agent without releasing the principal, the court stated:
402 Id. at 910. The defendant physician was a surgeon, but according to the supreme court, the
plaintiff sought to hold the hospital liable for his actions under Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d
684 (W. Va. 1991). Woodrum, 559 S.E.2d at 910. The court did not analyze why the hospital was
liable for the surgeon.
403 Id.
404 Id.
405 Id. at 909.
406 Id. at 911-12. The court analyzes Bumgarner v. Sims, 79 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 1953), as
suggesting that the liability of principals and agents is joint, meaning release of one does not re-
lease the other. Woodrum, 559 S.E.2d at 911. Even while declaring this analysis as being based
on dictum, the court states "thus, on stare decisis grounds, we would be hard pressed to disregard
the relevant statement in Bumgarner as dictum." Id. at 912. The statement footnotes Dailey v.
Bechtel Corp., 207 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1974):
Stare decisis is not a rule of law but is a matter of judicial policy.... It is a
policy which promotes certainty, stability and uniformity in the law. It should
be deviated from only when urgent reason requires deviation .... In the rare
case when it clearly is apparent that an error has been made or that the
application of an outmoded rule, due to changing conditions, results in
injustice, deviation from that policy is warranted.
[Vol. 105
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It would be peculiar indeed if we were to allow a plaintiff to
gratuitously dismiss a primarily liable tortfeasor without conse-
quence to the right to proceed against a vicariously responsible
defendant, but impose the harsh sanction of total preclusion
simply because the plaintiff was successful in obtaining some
measure of recompense for his or her injuries.4 °7
Oddly, the opinion states the hospital has a right of implied indemnity
enforceable by cross claim or third party complaint despite the settlement.40 8
In this regard, however, we simply do not see how the Hospital
could in any way be prejudiced by a rule which permits plain-
tiffs to proceed further against it in the present matter. As we
have seen, had they chosen, the plaintiffs could have appropri-
ately brought an action solely against the Hospital, or otherwise
voluntarily dismissed the defendant physician. Significantly, a
vicariously liable defendant's right to implied indemnity is not
affected by settlement between a plaintiff and other liable par-
ties. The substantive impact of the settlement agreement in this
case is therefore not materially different from what would result
if plaintiffs had chosen to utilize procedures that have long been
permitted under West Virginia law.4°
Commenting further, the Woodrum court suggested an indemnity action
may be brought in a later action:
This raises the very real possibility, however, that the primarily
liable agent will remain liable for the full amount of damages
notwithstanding the fact that he or she has settled with the
plaintiff. But, "[a]s to any subsequent action by the [principal]
against the [agent], '[a] primary wrongdoer enters [settlement]
Woodrum, 559 S.E.2d at 913 n.8. Here, stare decisis based on dicta from a 1953 case compelled
the court to place liability on hospitals where the specific issue had not been addressed in West
Virginia, and where a compelling policy argument can be made that it is unnecessary to impose
liability for West Virginia hospitals where physicians settle for less than policy limits. Con-
versely, in Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 558 S.E.2d 681 (W. Va. 2001), the court completely ignored
stare decisis and overruled a 1991 case on point to apply the "discovery rule" to wrongful death
actions. See Miller v. Romeo, 413 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1991).
4W 559 S.E.2d at 914.
408 Id. at 915.
4W Id. (citing Syl. Pt. 7, Hager v. Marshall, 505 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1998) ("In non-product
liability multi-party civil actions, a good faith settlement between a plaintiff and a defendant will
extinguish the right of a non-settling defendant to seek implied indemnity unless such non-settling
defendant is without fault.")).
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agreements at the peril of being later held to respond again in an
indemnification action brought against him by the vicarious
wrongdoer."' This potentially undesirable consequence can, of
course, be avoided by providing in the settlement agreement
that the plaintiff will indemnify the settling defendant for any
amount that such party may be called upon to pay in excess of
the settlement amount. In such case the plaintiff would have lit-
tle, if any, incentive to continue pursuing a judgment against the
derivatively responsible principal, thus effectively bringing the
action to a conclusion.al
In a footnote, the court referred to indemnity language in the release,
suggesting that the plaintiff agreed to indemnify the physician for such claims,
thereby potentially resolving the problem.411  Thus, Woodrum suggests that
where an agent enters into a settlement, the principal has the right, by cross or
third party claim, to seek implied indemnity. In other words, settlement does
not protect the settling physician unless it includes the hospital alleged to be the
principal.
VI. UTPA CLAIMS
House Bill 601 also changes the law related to the Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act ("UTPA"), under which a statutory claim exists for any party injured
as a result of general business practices by insurers which violate the Act.
4 12
West Virginia Code section 55-7B-5(b) exempts medical malpractice insurers
from claims based on violation of the Act brought by third parties. UTPA ac-
tions by insureds are not precluded by the new provision, but cannot be filed
until the underlying action is resolved.413
Generally, a private cause of action exists for both first and third parties
under the UTPA.41 n Recognizing a private right of action under the statute, the
court in Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co.4 15 held that insurers are under an
410 Id. at 917 (quotation omitted).
411 Id. at n. 11.
412 Generally, a private cause of action exists for both first and third parties under the UTPA.
W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1992). Recognizing a private right of action under the statute, the court
in Jenkins v. J. C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981) (overruled in part by State
ex rel. State Farm v. Madden, 451 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1994)), held that insurers are under an
obligation to attempt, in good faith, to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims in
which liability has become reasonably clear. However, UTPA claims do not apply to self-insured
parties. Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 566 S.E.2d 624, 629 (W. Va. 2002).
413 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-5(b).
414 W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1992).
415 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981).
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obligation to attempt, in good faith, to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable set-
tlement of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.4 16
VII. HOSPITAL LIABILITY ISSUES
Hospitals and other health care facilities face broad liability despite the
reforms set forth in the MPLA.41 7 Like any other employer, hospitals are liable
for the actions of employees in the scope of employment.418 Hospitals, how-
ever, have a unique relationship with physicians who practice within their walls.
Physicians, after a credentialing process, are granted privileges as part of the
hospital's medical staff. These privileges allow them to admit patients and prac-
tice medicine in the hospitals. Generally, hospitals are not liable for the actions
of physicians who are members of their medical staff and are treated as inde-
pendent contractors. 41 9 For this reason, hospitals are not liable for the failure of
physicians to obtain informed consent.42°
The liability of hospitals for staff physicians has been expanded in sev-
eral ways in West Virginia. "Where a patient goes to a hospital seeking medical
services and is forced to rely on the hospital's choice of physician to render
those services, the hospital may be found vicariously liable for the physician's
negligence.,' 421 In Thomas v. Raleigh General Hospital,422 the court reversed
summary judgment in favor of a hospital where the patient had no choice but to
accept the anesthesiologist provided by the hospital.423 Similarly, hospitals are
416 Id. at 258-59. In Syllabus Point 4 of Doddrill v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 491
S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1997), the court stated:
To maintain a private action based upon violations of [West Virginia] Code §
33-11-4(9), the plaintiff must prove 1) the conduct in question constitutes
more than a single violation of [West Virginia] Code § 33-114(9); 2) the vio-
lations arise from separate, discrete acts or omissions in the claim settlement;
and 3) the violations arise from a habit, custom, usage or business policy of
the insurer, so that, viewing the conduct as a whole, the finder of fact is able to
conclude that the practice or practices are sufficiently pervasive or sufficiently
sanctioned by the insurance company so that the conduct can by considered a
"general business practice" and not an isolated event.
417 See Thomas J. Humey, Jr., Hospital Liability in West Virginia, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 943
(1993).
418 See Taylor v. Cabell Huntington Hosp., 538 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 2000).
419 Thomas v. Raleigh Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222, 225 (W. Va. 1987); Cross v. Trapp, 294
S.E.2d 446, 459 (W. Va. 1982). See generally Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Sanitorium for
Negligence of Physician or Surgeon, 51 A.L.R.4th 235 § 5 (1987).
420 Cross, 294 S.E.2d at 459.
421 Thomas, 358 S.E.2d at 225; see also Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky.
1985); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46 (Ohio 1994).
422 358 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1987).
423 Id. at 226.
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generally vicariously liable for the actions of emergency room physicians, re-
gardless of the employment or other relationship the physician has with the hos-
pital:
Where a hospital makes emergency room treatment available to
serve the public as an integral part of its facilities, the hospital is
estopped to deny that the physicians and other medical person-
nel on duty providing treatment are its agents. Regardless of
any contractual arrangements with so-called independent con-
tractors, the hospital is liable to the injured patient for acts of
malpractice committed in its emergency room, so long as the
requisite proximate cause and damages are present.
424
However, ostensible agency has limits. In Hicks v. Ghaphery,425 the
court affirmed summary judgment for the hospital, rejecting plaintiff's argument
that the hospital was vicariously liable for the physician defendant's negligence.
In Hicks, the plaintiff was referred to the defendant, who was the on-call physi-
cian for the emergency room on April 12, 1996. The alleged negligence, how-
ever, occurred four days later during a surgery. Also important to the court's
conclusion was the consent form signed by the plaintiff, which stated that physi-
cians providing services were not employees or agents of the hospital.
426
Advertising may provide the basis for ostensible agency.427 In Glover v.
St. Mary's Hospital of Huntington,428 the supreme court reversed summary judg-
ment for the hospital in a wrongful death case, finding a possible issue of fact as
to whether the hospital's advertising rendered it liable for the acts of the
defendant surgeon. The hospital moved for summary judgment after the
plaintiff failed to name an expert witness critical of its conduct.430 The circuit
court granted the motion because the surgeon was not the ostensible agent of the
hospital and there was no testimony of independent negligence by the hospi-
tal.
431
The plaintiff appealed, asserting a factual issue about the hospital's vi-
carious liability because the hospital "held itself out" as providing the services
424 Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684, 692 (W. Va. 1991).
425 571 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 2002).
426 Id. at 331.
427 See id.
428 551 S.E.2d 31 (W. Va. 2001).
429 The defendant surgeon was insured by PIE Mutual, which was insolvent. Id. at 33.
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the plaintiff required in television and print advertising.432 The plaintiff asserted
(as she had by affidavit below) that she "trusted" the hospital to provide appro-
priate care based upon the kindness of the hospital's staff which led her to be-
lieve they were taking care of everything.433 Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that
she relied upon an "extensive" television and radio advertising campaign by the
hospital.
Importantly, the supreme court reversed the summary judgment because
the circuit judFe's order did not contain any findings related to the advertising
liability issue. 3 The Glover court noted, however, that other courts have held
hospitals liable under the doctrine of ostensible agency based on advertising
campaigns, and suggested that such a finding is consistent with ostensible
agency as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.435 The court went on
to discuss the hospital's television and print advertising and also noted that it
was aware that some hospitals even used billboards.436
432 Id.
433 Id. at 34. Whether "kindness" by nurses is a basis for establishing vicarious liability for
other health care providers was not addressed by the court. Common sense would suggest that
personal kindness by its nurses cannot justify finding a hospital liable for the acts of independent
physicians. See Phinney v. Vinson, 605 A.2d 849 (Vt. 1992) (apology for "inadequate" operation
not admission of liability).
434 See Glover, 551 S.E.2d at 34. Glover reinforces the need for summary judgment orders to
set forth findings of fact. "Although our standard of review for summary judgment remains de
novo, a circuit court's order granting summary judgment must set out factual findings sufficient to
permit meaningful appellate review. Findings of fact, by necessity, include those facts which the
circuit court finds relevant, determinative of the issues and undisputed." Syl. Pt. 3, Scites v.
Marcum, 560 S.E.2d 505 (W. Va. 2002) (citing Fayette County Nat'l Bank v. Lilly, 484 S.E.2d
232 (W. Va. 1997)).
435 Glover, 551 S.E.2d at 35. The court stated:
[iln conjunction with this issue, we note that:
Modem hospitals have spent billions of dollars on marketing to
nurture the image that they are full-care modem health facilities.
Billboards, television commercials and newspaper advertisements
tell the public to look to its local hospital for every manner of
care, from the critical surgery and life-support required by a major
accident to the minor tissue repairs resulting from a friendly game
of softball. These efforts have helped bring the hospitals vastly in-
creased revenue, a new role in daily health care and, ironically, a
heightened exposure to lawsuits[.]
Also, [o]ne who represents that another is his servant or other agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of such
apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the
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Justice Davis dissented, pointing out that the "advertising" issue was not
relevant as there was no evidence presented that the decedent patient relied on
the advertising campaign in choosing the surgeon.437 Justice Davis discussed
established law that hospitals are not liable for the negligence of physicians on
their medical staff absent evidence the patient relied upon the hospital to supply
the physician in question.438 In a footnote, Justice Davis also expressed dis-
agreement with the use of advertising as a basis of liability because it will either
cause all hospitals to stop informing the public of available care, or make them
strictly liable for the acts of all physicians on their premises. 439
In addition to opinions expanding the liability of hospitals for non-
employees for a variety of reasons, the court's decision in Woodrum v. John-
son441 is highly significant. By holding that a plaintiff can settle with a non-
employee physician and proceed against a hospital that is vicariously liable for
the physician, Woodrum will undoubtedly result in hospitals being named in
more cases and forced to incur defense and settlement costs even where there
are no independent allegations of negligence. Ultimately, it appears a hospital
can be forced to go to trial defending a doctor it did not even employ and simply
get an offset for the settlement in the same fashion as any other settling defen-
dant. Woodrum's long analysis bears reading, as it is not confined to MPLA
cases.442
In several decisions, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
mentioned a cause of action for "negligent credentialing," but the parameters of
this claim have yet to be explored in a published opinion." 3 Since hospitals are
437 Id. at 36-37 (Davis, J., dissenting).
438 Id. at 36 (Davis, J., dissenting) (citing Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982); Tho-
mas v. Raleigh Gen. Hosp., 358 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1987); Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d
684 (W. Va. 1991)). Specifically, Justice Davis argued:
Mrs. Glover's affidavit indicating that she may have relied on Hospital adver-
tisements in forming her opinion that the Hospital would provide proper care
to Mr. Glover is irrelevant in this case. The affidavit could only be used, at
best, to support Mrs. Glover's derivative claim. In order to make such evi-
dence relevant, it had to be submitted by the Estate to demonstrate the adver-
tisement's effect on Mr. Glover's opinion of the Hospital's quality of care.
Glover v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Huntington, 551 S.E.2d 31, 37 (W. Va. 2001) (Davis, J., dissent-
ing).
439 Id. at 37 n.1 (Davis, J., dissenting). Not addressed in Glover is the fact that despite the
factual differences over agency, the plaintiff did not name an expert. See Goundry v. Wetzel-
Suffle, 568 S.E.2d 5 (W. Va. 2002).
440 559 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 2001).
441 See supra notes 400 to 411 for a detailed discussion of Woodrum.
442 See also Matheny v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., No. 30256, 2002 WL 31746852, at *8 (W. Va.
Dec. 6, 2002) (Albright, J., concurring) (restating dissent in Woodrum, 559 S.E.2d at 913).
443 See Andrews v. Reynolds Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 499 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va. 1997); Roberts v.
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expressly included in the MPLA definitions of health care providers and facili-
ties, the issue of credentialing should be one subject to proof by expert testi-
mony in the same fashion as actions against physicians.
West Virginia Code section 30-3C-2 provides immunity for peer review
activities, including the credentialing of physicians. 4 " However, while placing
liability upon hospitals for failing to police physicians, the supreme court has
narrowly construed this immunity. In one decision, Garrison v. Herbert J.
Thomas Memorial Hospital Association,4 5 the court, despite the immunity, al-
lowed a physician to sue a West Virginia hospital for tortious interference based
on information provided to another hospital for credentialing purposes." 6 The
court has also not hesitated to reverse the Board of Medicine when it impairs or
takes away a physician's license.4 7
Hospitals in litigation sometimes face discovery requests for informa-
tion arising from peer review activities.4 8 Under Rule 26(b)(1) of the West
Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action." There is a statutory privilege granted to peer review
activities by West Virginia Code section 30-3C-3. "Peer review" is defined
Stevens Clinic Hosp., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986). See generally Johnson v. Misericordia
Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
4 See Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 759 (W. Va. 1991) ("[T]he
fact that individuals conducting good-faith health care peer review are statutorily immunized from
civil liability for damages evinces a public policy encouraging health care professionals to monitor
the competency and professional conduct of their peers in order to safeguard and improve the
quality of patient care."); Young v. Saldanha, 431 S.E.2d 669, 673 (W. Va. 1993).
445 438 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993).
4" Id. at 11. The physician was denied privileges at a Wyoming hospital for failing to reveal a
disciplinary action at Thomas Hospital on his application for medical staff privileges. Id. at 9.
After unsuccessfully suing that hospital, Garrison v. Bd. of Trustees of Mem 'l Hosp., 795 P.2d
190, 191 (Wyo. 1990), he brought suit against Thomas Hospital. Garrison, 458 S.E.2d at 6. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the dismissal of the action, holding the phy-
sician could bring an action for tortious interference with contractual relations against the hospital
if the information provided to the Wyoming hospital was false. Id. at 11.
447 See Webb v. W. Va. Bd. of Med., 569 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 2002); W. Va. Bd. of Med. v.
Shafer, 535 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 2000); State ex rel. Webb v. W. Va. Bd. of Med., 506 S.E.2d 830
(W. Va. 1998).
448 As this article addresses medical professional liability actions, suits by physicians against
hospitals arising out of decisions on medical staff appointment or clinical privileges are not exam-
ined. However "[t]he decision of a private hospital revoking or otherwise affecting adversely the
staff appointment or clinical privileges of a medical staff member will be sustained when, as an
element of fair hearing procedures, there is substantial evidence supporting the decision." Syl. Pt.
4, Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750 (1991); see also Daily Gazette Co. v.
W. Va. Bd. of Med., 352 S.E.2d 66, 72 (W. Va. 1986) ("To the extent that any hospital peer re-
view information is brought before the West Virginia Board of Medicine under West Virginia
Code § 30-3-14(o) (1986), after probable cause to substantiate the charges is found, the public is
entitled to such information.").
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as "the procedure for evaluation by health care professionals of the quality
and efficiency of services ordered or performed by other health care profes-
sionals." 449 Peer review is performed by "review organizations," defined in
West Virginia Code section 30-3C-1:
any committee or organization engaging in peer review, includ-
ing a hospital utilization review committee, a hospital tissue
committee, a medical audit committee, a health insurance re-
view committee, a hospital plan corporation review committee,
a professional health service plan review committee or organi-
zation, a dental review committee, a physicians' advisory com-
mittee, a podiatry advisory committee, a nursing advisory
committee, any committee or organization established pursuant
to a medical assistance program, and any committee established
by one or more state or local professional societies or institutes,
to gather and review information relating to the care and treat-
ment of patients for the purposes of (i) evaluating and improv-
ing the quality of health care rendered; (ii) reducing morbidity
or mortality; or (iii) establishing and enforcing guidelines de-
signed to keep within reasonable bounds the cost of health care.
It shall also mean any hospital board committee, or organization
reviewing the professional qualifications or activities of its
medical staff or applicants for admission thereto, and any pro-
fessional standards review organizations established or required
under state or federal statutes or regulations.45°
West Virginia Code section 30-3C-3 protects the peer review process
from discovery in any civil action, providing:
The proceedings and record of a review organization shall be
confidential and privileged and shall not be subject to subpoena
or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence in any civil
action arising out of the matters which are subject to evaluation
and review by such organization and no person who is in atten-
dance at a meeting of such organization shall be permitted or
required to testify in any such civil action as to any evidence or
other matters produced or presented during the proceedings of
such organization or as to any findings, recommendations,
evaluations, opinions or other actions of such organization or
any members thereof: Provided, That information, documents
or records otherwise available from original sources are not to
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be construed as immune from discovery or use in any civil ac-
tion merely because they were presented during such organiza-
tion, nor should any person who testifies before such organiza-
tion or who is a member of such organization be prevented from
testifying as to a matter within his knowledge, but the witness
shall not be asked about his testimony before such an organiza-
tion or opinions formed by him as a result of said organization
451hearings ....
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has consistently held
"[t]he enactment of [West Virginia] Code [section] 30-3C-1 to -3 (1993)
clearly evinces a public policy encouraging health care professionals to
monitor the competency and professional conduct of their peers in order to
safeguard and improve the quality of patient care. ' 452 The statutory privilege
arises from the belief that without an assurance of confidentiality, "physi-
cians [will be] reluctant to sit on peer review committees and engage in frank
evaluations of their colleagues., 453 "[C]onstructive professional criticism
cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion
will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice
suit. '454 In State ex rel. Shroades v. Henry,4 55 the court stated that "[tihe
peer review privilege represents a legislative choice between medical staff
candor and the plaintiff's access to evidence. 456
The peer review privilege protects the "records and proceedings" of
review organizations, but not documents otherwise available from original
sources:
The language of the statute grants a privilege to all the records
and proceedings of a review organization, but no privilege at-
taches to information, documents or records considered by a re-
view organization if the material is "otherwise available from
original sources." Material that originates in a review organiza-
tion remains privileged even if held by a non-review organiza-
tion and material that originates in a non-review organization
does not become privileged after presentation to a review or-
451 Id. § 30-3C-3 (2002).
452 Syl. Pt. 6, State ex rel. Charles Town Gen. Hosp. v. Sanders, 556 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va. 2001)
(quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Young v. Saldanha, 431 S.E.2d 669 (1993)); see also Daily Gazette Co. v. W.
Va. Bd. of Med., 352 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1986).
453 Young, 431 S.E.2d at 673 (internal quotations omitted).
454 Daily Gazette Co., 352 S.E.2d at 72 n.12 (quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D.
249, 249-50 (D.D.C. 1970)).
455 421 S.E.2d 264 (W. Va. 1992).
456 Id. at 268.
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ganization. Therefore, material sought from a review organiza-
tion is privileged; however if material is sought from a non-
review organization, the origin of the document determines if it
is privileged.457
The party asserting the peer review privilege has the burden of dem-
onstrating that it applies. 458 Blanket assertions of privilege are generally not
sufficient to invoke the peer review privilege. 459 The fact that a physician
has obtained peer review documents in a suit over the termination of his
privileges by a hospital does not establish a waiver allowing the documents'
discovery in a civil action against the physician.46°
"The determination of which materials are privileged under [West
Virginia] Code [section] 30-3C-1 [1975] et seq. is essentially a factual ques-
tion,"4 6' which first requires an examination of whether the committee from
whom information is sought is a "review organization" within the meaning
of statute. 62 The circuit court should first examine the hospital by-laws or
other documents463 to determine if the committee or organization involved is
a review organization as defined in West Virginia Code section 30-3C-1. 4M
If the bylaws do not clearly specify that the committee was engaging in peer
review, the party asserting the privilege has the burden of presenting addi-
tional evidence and information to the court. 45
Once the circuit court determines the committee was engaged in peer
457 Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
458 Id. at 265 Syl. Pt. 2.
459 Id. at 268.
4W See Young v. Saldahna, 431 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1993).
461 Id. at 670 Syl. Pt. 1.
462 See Sanders, 556 S.E.2d at 93.
463 As recognized by section 30-3C-1, there are "review organizations" other than those created
by hospitals, such as "any committee established by one or more state or local professional socie-
ties or institutes ...." W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-1. For example, the Joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Hospital Organizations ("JCAHO") "establishes standards and conducts voluntary ac-
creditation programs for West Virginia hospitals ...." Daily Gazette Co., Inc., v. W. Va. Bd. of
Med., 352 S.E.2d 66, 71n.10 (W. Va. 1986). Surveys by the JCAHO have been held to be "peer
review" not subject to discovery. Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E.2d 937, 942 (Ill. 1985) (JCAHO
accreditation manual used to show materials were gathered to improve quality control and patient
care protected by peer review act); see also Variety Children's Hosp. v. Mishler, 670 So. 2d 184,
186 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that JCAHO surveys not discoverable); Humana Hosp.
Corp., Inc. v. Spears-Petersen, 867 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that JCAHO
accreditation reports held confidential). The party asserting the privilege, therefore, should submit
evidence demonstrating the purpose and function of the review committee in question.
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review, it must determine whether the challenged documents come within
the privilege, which protects the "proceedings and record" of the review or-
ganization. 466 The party asserting the privilege has to prepare a privilege
log, identifying the document name, date, custodian, source and reason for
creation.6 7 Identification of documents does not breach the privilege af-
forded by section 30-3C-1. Where necessary, the court can review in cam-
era the documents argued to be undiscoverable. 46 8 Where the circuit court
rules the material is discoverable, a petition for a writ of prohibition is ap-
propriate.469
In State ex rel. Sanders v. Charlestown Hospital,470 the court applied
the aforementioned analysis and held that a physician's application for privi-
leges was protected. The court found that the hospital's credentialing com-
mittee was a "review organization" because it was responsible under the
hospital's by-laws for considering candidates for staff privileges or creden-
tials.47' The peer review privilege therefore applied to protect the physi-
cian's application for privileges from discovery.472 Similarly, in Young v.
Saldahna,473 the court held that records of a hospital's actions against the
privileges of a physician were protected from discovery in a malpractice
case, even though the physician had obtained them in a separate action
against the hospital over the termination of his privileges.474
On a related issue, the court has held that hospital incident reports are
not protected from discovery by the "work product" privilege. In State ex
rel. United Hosp. Center, Inc. v. Bedell,475 the court held a hospital's inci-
dent report was not protected by the attorney client privilege or the work
product doctrine. Examining the hospital's policies and deposition testi-
mony of witnesses, the court concluded that "[tihe incident report prepared,
in this case, . . . immediately after [the patient] fell in the emergency room
was completed, not for purposes of litigation, but in the ordinary course of
the hospital's business." An investigative report by the hospital's counsel,
466 W. VA. CODE § 30-3C-3 (2002).
467 Id.; see also Feathers v. W. Va. Bd. of Med., 562 S.E.2d 488, 497 (W. Va. 2001).
468 Henry, 421 S.E.2d at 270.
469 See State ex rel. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199, 207 (W. Va. 1997).
470 556 S.E.2d 85 (2001).
471 Id. at 92.
472 Sanders, 556 S.E.2d at 93-94.
473 431 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1993).
474 Id. at 675-76.
475 484 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1997).
476 Id. at 213. The court found the attorney-client privilege did not apply because the record
did not establish the nurse preparing the report contemplated an attorney-client relationship when
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however, was subject to the protection under the work product doctrine, ex-
cept that it was waived when the counsel was produced for deposition as a
designated corporate representative.477 Bedell does not address whether an
incident report can be protected by the peer review privilege, as the issue
was not argued in the circuit court and therefore not considered on appeal.478
VIII. DAMAGES
The MPLA limits non-economic loss to one million dollars. 479 Accord-
ing to West Virginia Code section 55-7B-2(g), non-economic losses "include[]
but [are] not limited to pain, suffering, mental anguish and grief." The "cap" on
non-economic loss is constitutional, having survived challenges in two cases.
480
The cap does not limit economic losses.481 The trial court has discretion as to
whether to instruct the jury about the limitations.48z
Arguably, the cap on non-economic loss applies per occurrence, not per
plaintiff. In Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.,483 the court ap-
plied the cap to reduce non-economic loss awards to one million dollars. The
first awards reduced were the damages awarded to the parents of the brain dam-
aged child for loss of consortium.484 Then, the court reduced the child's award
to one million dollars.485 Although Robinson strongly suggests that the cap is an
overall limit on non-economic loss, the court has not, in a syllabus point, de-
cided whether it applies per defendant, or as an overall limit.486 The court also
has not articulated how the cap applies in agency situations (for example, where
a non-employee physician is alleged to be agent of hospital).
she submitted the report. Id. at 209.
477 Id. at 213-14.
478 Id. at 208 n.9.
479 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2000).
480 Verba v. Ghaphery, 552 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 2001); Robinson v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1992).
481 See Andrews v. Reynolds Mem'l Hosp., 499 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va. 1997) (affirming jury
award including $1.7 million dollars for lost future income for a deceased infant; rejecting argu-
ment that the award was speculative).
482 W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2000).
483 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1992).
44 Id. at 889.
485 Id.
486 See Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989) (holding damages cap applies
per case, not per defendant); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 562 S.E.2d 82 (N.C. 2002) (North Carolina
statute capping punitive damages is constitutional, and the limitation applies per plaintiff, not per
defendant); cf Frye v. Future Inns of America-Huntington, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 237 (W. Va. 2002)
(holding incidental damages under Human Rights Act applies per case, not per respondent).
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Where the jury's verdict form is unclear as to the amount of non-
economic damages awarded, the court will not attempt to sort it out to apply the
cap. In Gerver v. Benavides, 487 the supreme court refused to apply the cap to
reduce a $2 million dollar verdict because the jury verdict form mixed special
and general damages. To preserve the applicability of the cap, the defendant
must submit a verdict form or ask for special interrogatories that clearly separate
economic and non-economic damages.488 Under Gerver, confusion may result
in the cap not being applied.489
Consistent with Gerver, the verdict form does not have to contain mul-
tiple lines for different types of non-economic loss. The simplest way to comply
with Rule 49(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure is to allow the
jury to assign non-economic loss consistent with the court's instructions. Rule
49(b), which governs the use of jury interrogatories used in conjunction with a
general jury verdict form, states that "[t]he court may submit to the jury, to-
gether with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon
one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. ' '49°
By its terms, Rule 49(b) limits the jury interrogatories to issues of fact
"the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. ''49 Use of jury interrogatories
with respect to damages is appropriate when it is necessary to separate the dam-
age elements. 492 In Gebhardt v. Smith,493 the jury was instructed to return a gen-
eral verdict and set forth the damages for medical bills and lost income. The
form also required the jury to itemize damages in the following areas:
(1) "pain and suffering experienced to date, if any"; (2) "pain
and suffering to be experience in the future if any"; and (3)
"loss of enjoyment of life, including the inability to engage in
487 530 S.E.2d 701 (W. Va. 1999).
488 Id. at 708.
489 An interesting comparison to the approach taken in Gerver v. Benavides is seen in Beard v.
Lim, 408 S.E.2d 772 (W. Va. 1991). In Beard, the circuit court applied prejudgment interest to a
general verdict, refusing to sort out the items of pecuniary damages to which prejudgment interest
applies. Id. at 773. The supreme court reversed, stating that "when the lawyers and the trial court
can sort out the parts of a judgment on which interest should be added, even without special inter-
rogatories, the trial court should do so." Id. at 777 (quoting Miller v. Monongahela Power Co.,
403 S.E.2d 406, 416 (W. Va. 1991)). The Beard approach is more in keeping with the public
policy of limiting non-economic loss expressed by the legislature in enacting the non-economic
damages cap.
490 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
491 Id.
492 See Grove v. Myers, 382 S.E.2d 536, 542 (W. Va. 1989) (noting that since prejudgment
interest is only recoverable on special damages, "a special interrogatory should be submitted to the
jury for it to designate the amount of special or liquid damages").
493 420 S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1992).
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normal pursuits and activities and permanent disability and dis-
figurement."
494
The Supreme Court of Appeals commented on deficiencies in this form:
It is not clear from the record why the jury was requested to
itemize the general verdict form in the manner set forth in the
text of the opinion. Such specificity in a personal injury case
such as this appears to be limited value. It may, in some cases,
cause error by focusing on the itemized categories and the po-
tential inconsistencies contained therein (i.e., a jury could be
presented evidence of substantial pain and suffering in the past
and of only a limited likelihood of pain and suffering in the fu-
ture, and nonetheless grant more damages for future pain and
suffering). The potential for error by itemizations such as this
in such a personal injury case is greater than in verdicts of a
more general nature.495
IX. CONCLUSION
Medical professional liability actions in West Virginia present many
complex and unique legal issues in addition to the difficult task of mastering the
medicine involved. Hopefully, this article highlighted some of these issues for
the West Virginia practitioner based on the present statutory scheme and case
law. To be sure, the coming months will see new statutes and legal decisions
which will further impact practitioners in this area.
494 Id. at 278.
495 Id. at n.3.
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